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On 1 June 2017, the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) approved 
the implementation of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) for all Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies. The IRBA is of the opinion that MAFR will 
increase audit quality, improve auditor independence, increase market competition, 
and increase the rate of transformation in the profession. The auditing and 
accounting professions have met this announcement with sustained resistance, with 
the charge being led by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(SAICA). Among the arguments of those who oppose the implementation are the 
perceived large costs that are incurred to on-board a new audit firm, the decreased 
institutional intelligence of the client by the new audit firm, and the loss of a strong 
working relationship between auditor and audit client. Many believe that the large 
audit firms stand to benefit significantly from the implementation of MAFR. This is 
mainly because audit clients will tend only to select large audit firms to perform their 
audit. The smaller market will have an increased audit firm rotation rate (turnover), 
meaning that large audit firms will also be able to target small audit clients. It is 
feared that these factors will concentrate the market further. This study aimed to 
provide insight into the key role-players and factors from the viewpoint of accounting 
professionals. The study utilised a grounded theory methodology, in the form of in-
depth interviews with audit profession and industry experts. The results provide 
evidence of what accounting professionals think will lead to success once MAFR is 
implemented. This study is unique in South Africa as it surveyed auditors and audit 
clients. Although not a key aim, this study also sought to shed light on the perceived 
challenges that are facing the auditing profession in relation to the implementation 
of MAFR. 
Keywords: Mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), auditor, audit client, previous 
audit firm, key factors, role-players 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background to the research 
Audit reports are vital to business and commerce in the modern world. Auditor 
independence is arguably the most important element to consider regarding the 
soundness of the auditor’s report. Auditor independence will contribute to the 
credibility of a company’s financial statements (Cameran, Prencipe & Trombetta, 
2005). In addition, auditor independence is the most compelling way to illustrate to 
stakeholders that the auditor is performing audit tasks in an objective manner. This 
fundamental principle of independence means that the auditor has the ability to 
suppress biases when coming to a judgement (International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), 2016). There are broadly two types of independence, 
namely: 
• Independence of mind – the mind of the auditor is free from influence to
express a true option that is free from compromise.
• Independence of appearance – avoiding facts and circumstances that are so
significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to
conclude, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances, that a firm’s, or a
member of the audit or assurance team’s integrity, objectivity or professional
scepticism has been compromised.
Financial reporting is the presentation of financial information in a meaningful way 
to facilitate the use of this information (International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), 1989). Financial statements are the structured reports that are the 
cornerstone of financial reporting, although there is growing emphasis on non-
financial data. Each financial statement focuses on a particular area of a business 
(current year performance, balances, cash flow etc.). They disclose quantitative and 
qualitative information (IASB, 1989). Legislation compels all companies with a public 
interest to produce financial statements (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2008). All 
companies with a public interest, which includes all listed companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), are required to have a financial statement 
audit, by an external auditor (JSE, 2015; RSA, 2008). A financial statement audit is 
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when an audit practitioner obtains sufficient appropriate audit evidence to express 
a conclusion on the financial statements of that entity to enhance its degree of 
confidence (IAASB, 2011). This audit takes the form of a systematic verification of 
actual transactions and balances. As a result, it is critical that the auditor is 
independent in mind of the client. The auditor also needs to be independent of 
appearance, because if he were not, the audit opinion would be useless.  
1.2.  Emergence of MAFR in South Africa 
In South Africa, the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (the IRBA) is legally 
mandated to oversee the auditing profession for the protection of the public interest. 
The IRBA itself acknowledges this and takes its mandate seriously:  
“The IRBA was established on 1 April 2006 in terms of Section 3 of the 
Auditing Profession Act, Act No. 26 of 2005, which replaced its 
predecessor body, the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board, 
established in 1951” (IRBA, 2016b, p. 9; IRBA, 2005). 
In the middle of 2015, the IRBA embarked on research into ways to strengthen the 
South African auditor’s independence (IRBA, 2016a). Alternatives that were 
considered include but are not limited to mandatory audit tendering, mandatory joint 
audits, and other possible combinations (IRBA, 2016a). The IRBA took a decision 
on July 28, 2016 to implement mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). 
“MAFR refers to the rotation of the audit firm, i.e. a different audit firm is 
appointed after the prescribed rotation period and the new firm 
designates the new key audit partners, including the engagement partner 
for the audit” (SAICA, 2016a, p. 4). 
1.3.  An overview of existing literature on mandatory audit firm rotation 
MAFR has been a popular topic through the world with many arguments for and 
against it. In South Africa on the one hand, the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAICA) has asserted that the unquantifiable costs of MAFR outweigh 
the perceived benefits (SAICA, 2016a). SAICA has produced a study that was 
composed from a questionnaire that was circulated to all chartered accountants; 
however, other than the perception of those participants, there is no other study that 
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SAICA has produced to validate their claims of additional costs (SAICA, 2017, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). The IRBA has contested that the current regulatory 
environment is inadequate and open to abuse through the development of familiarity 
between auditors and their clients (SAICA, 2016a; IRBA, 2016b). 
1.3.1.  A brief history of mandatory audit firm rotation in other economies 
MAFR has been in existence for a long time in both the developed and the 
developing world (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997). The South African economy has the 
challenge of being a developing economy in Africa. It would thus be beneficial to 
look briefly into the experiences of countries that implemented MAFR, and in 
countries that are comparable with South Africa. The debate on MAFR has been 
raging from the late 1970s, with voices from academics, regulators and practitioners 
alike (Dattin, 2017). The debate is fuelled by the fact that the auditor’s profitability is 
dependent on him obtaining and retaining clients. Audit clients are therefore often 
viewed as a long-term revenue streams in the absence of any restriction on audit 
tenure (Edwards, 2014). This has pitted the regulators and the practitioners on 
opposing sides with the academics being spilt.  
Since mid-1974 in Italy, MAFR has been required for listed companies. The scope 
of companies that are included in this regulation has been steadily increasing over 
the last 40 years. The affected companies now comprise all listed companies and 
all with a public interest as defined by legislation (Corbellaa, Florioa, Gotti, & 
Mastrolia, 2015; Cameran, et al., 2005; SAICA, 2016b). 
Poor business practices in Brazil during the late 1990s caused the government 
together with the Brazilian regulatory body (Cadastro Nacional de Auditores 
Independentes) to implement MAFR for the banking sector (Implemented in 1996). 
The requirement was later extended to all listed companies in 1999, with an 
enforcement date of 2001 (Cameran, et al., 2005; SAICA, 2016b). Implementation 
of this legislated requirement was a problem; the regulator amended the rule twice, 
which caused uncertainty in capital markets. As a result, in 2008 the requirement 
was repealed for all companies. The regulator seemed to struggle to determine the 
appropriate rotational period and the rule’s scope (SAICA, 2017). However, in 2012, 
the Brazilian regulator implemented the rotational rule for non-bank listed 
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companies and companies with a public interest (SAICA, 2016b). The case of Brazil 
indicated how poor implementation can spell disaster. Its example underlines the 
significance of research such as that undertaken in this study for the future of South 
African business 
Companies that were registered on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (KOSDAQ) were required in 2003 to rotate audit firms every six years, 
although there are some exceptions (Cameran, et al., 2005). The implementation 
date was from 2006, and was applied prospectively (Kwon, , Lim, & Simnet., 2014). 
After extensive research and anecdotal comments from stakeholders, the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy was abolished in 2010 (Kwon, et al, 2014). The 
reason advanced was that the costs were vast and difficult to quantify, and the 
effectiveness of this measure was initially overestimated (SAICA, 2016b). 
In the early 2000s, India implemented a four-year rotation for banks and very soon, 
provident trusts and public sector companies were added to the provision (Cameran, 
et al., 2005; Naresh Chandra Committee, 2002). The Indian regulator saw so much 
value in the measure that it was extended to all listed companies – this was 
implemented in 2014 (SAICA, 2016b). 
1.3.2.  Arguments for and against mandatory audit firm rotation in South 
Africa 
The IRBA in its press release that announced the MAFR implementation indicated 
that the primary reason for the implementation of MAFR was the strengthening of 
auditor independence (IRBA, 2016a, 2016b).  
The IRBA also indicated other reasons for the implementation of MAFR. The other 
two objectives for implementation of MAFR are:  
• Address the market concentration imbalance in the audit market (IRBA,
2016b);
• Promote transformation in the audit market (IRBA, 2016b)
The IRBA regularly performs inspections on the audit quality of various audit 
engagements and the results of their inspections have indicated that 43% of all 
engagements inspected had significant deficiencies in ethical requirements. The 
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IRBA asserted that the cause of these was a breakdown of auditor independence 
and a lack of compliance (IRBA, 2016b; IRBA, 2015). There are numerous reasons 
that can be forwarded for a lack of auditor independence, but all reasons have a 
causal link to audit firm tenure. In South Africa, many audit firm tenures span over 
20 years (IRBA, 2016b).  
Client familiarity and reliance on prior year audit work are deficiencies brought about 
by long audit firm tenure (Lu & Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). Many in fact fear that long 
audit tenures may result in the auditor being reluctant to question and re-question 
underhanded practices, or even being complacent with following up on adverse 
audit findings (Barton, 2002).  
Following the SAICA’s release of the SAICA administrated MAFR survey results 
(SAICA, 2016d), SAICA had an MAFR indaba (conference) on the 10th of November 
2016 and later released a report to all members about the results of the indaba. 
There were seven themes discussed and all seven portrayed MAFR in a negative 
light. SAICA cited that there was inadequate consultation around the implementation 
of MAFR (SAICA, 2016e). Regardless of the indaba, SAICA has failed to produce 
arguments that can be subjected to an objective peer review. This calls into duty the 
validity of SAICA’s arguments.  
1.4.  Contribution of this study 
This study contributes to the existing literature as it has analysed the best practices 
as proposed by the industry’s members. The results of this analysis can assist other 
audit practitioners who face MAFR implementation, but do not have the resources 
to investigate the industry’s best practice. For individual practitioners to be able to 
access the best practises is critical because it may result in improvement in the 
outcome of an audit rotation. This study sets the foundation for the understanding 
of strategies that can be used to deal with MAFR. In addition, there is no research 
on how this will affect the KwaZulu-Natal market. 
1.5.  Problem statement 
Mandatory audit firm rotation will be implemented in South Africa from the April 1, 
2023. This is a major change to the business and regulatory environment of South 
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Africa. Many auditors and audit clients will not be adequately prepared for the 
implementation of MAFR. Initial consultation with stakeholders has yielded mixed 
viewpoints although the voice against MAFR is ever present among practitioners 
(particularly members in the larger audit firms) (SAICA, 2016c) (KPMG, 2017; 
Deloitte & Touche, 2017; AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 2017; SAICA, 2017; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2017; Omnia, 2017; Ernst & Young (EY), 2017). 
The first step in dealing with MAFR successfully is to understand the proposed 
strategies of the auditors and audit clients. As noted in Chapter 2 that follows, 
academic research has not found a clear answer in support or in rejection of MAFR 
(International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2017). In addition, existing 
research does not identify strategies that influence the success or failure of audit 
firm rotation in South Africa. If academic research were not to address this research 
gap, many business professionals would not understand how to tackle the 
implementation of MAFR.  
1.6.  Aim of the study 
As a result of the lack of literature on the strategies that can be used to deal with 
MAFR, this study aimed to answer the following question: What are the strategies 
to be used by KwaZulu-Natal practitioners once MAFR is implemented? 
1.7.  Objectives of the study 
In an effort to identify the strategies that can be implemented to deal with MAFR, 
this study looked at key role-players in these strategies and the impact of their 
actions (new external audit firm, previous audit firm and audit client). In addition, the 
study also looked at factors that will affect the strategies. The research will look at 
both the key role-players and the key factors thus; a picture of the strategy would 
emerge. 
In light of the above, the following were the objectives of this research: 
• To establish the role of the new external auditor in successful audit firm
rotation in KwaZulu-Natal.
• To establish the role of the previous external auditor in successful audit firm
rotation in KwaZulu-Natal.
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• To establish the role of the audit client in successful audit firm rotation in
KwaZulu-Natal.
• To establish the key factors in successful audit firm jjnrotation in KwaZulu-
Natal.
1.8.  Outline of the study 
This chapter has introduced the study, including the research question and the 
motivation for this research. Chapter 2 introduces the underlying theories on which 
MAFR is based and looks at global trends. The chapter also debates global 
arguments raised by practitioners and regulators for and against MAFR. Chapter 3 
details the methodology used in the study. Chapter 4 presents the results of the 
research. From these results, Chapter 5 draws conclusions and recommendations 
of the study. Furthermore, implications of the study and its contributions to the 
existing literature are discussed. That chapter finally sets out the limitations of the 
study and highlights potential areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This literature review presents the relevance of auditor independence in the audit 
profession. The implementation of MAFR in developing and developed economies 
around the world as a measure to improve auditor independence is presented. This 
literature review also deals with the effects of MAFR in the countries where it has 
been implemented. 
In the business environment, the owners of a company (the principal) will appoint a 
management team (the agent) to act on their behalf in leading and directing their 
company. This creates a situation in which there is a separation between the 
individuals owning a company and the individuals controlling a company (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The interaction between the agent and the principal is explained by 
the agency theory. Essentially, the agency conflict is the question of whether or not 
the shareholder can rely on what management is revealing regarding the 
shareholders’ company (Ncolaescu, 2014).  
This separation in control and ownership and the agency problems that could arise 
from it can be mitigated to some extent with the introduction of an independent third 
party. This is essentially what necessitates the auditor’s role. The unfortunate 
problem is that management has significant influence over the auditor that is chosen 
(Hohenfels, 2016). This may not seem apparent given the measures that are in 
place when a company follows the best practice in governance such has the King 
IV (Institute of Directors Southern Africa (IoDSA), 2016).  
This creates a breeding ground for a close relationship to form between the auditor 
and management of an entity (Harber, 2016a). These close relationships could 
ultimately be to the detriment of the shareholder. 
On the other hand, an Australian study investigated the interaction between auditor-
client tenure and audit quality. A regression model was utilised in that study. In that 
study the auditor-client relationship was defined in two ways: (1) the tenure of the 
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individual person-to-person relationship between the audit partner and the audit 
client’s chief financial officer (CFO); and (2) the audit firm tenure in relation to the 
audit client. The study found that the individual did reduce audit quality, but there 
was a significant correlation between the improvement of audit quality and longer 
audit firm tenure (Ball, Tyler, & Wells, 2015). This seems to indicate that there is 
benefit to be derived from the relationship with the auditor. This was previously 
indicated in a study by Wang and Tuttle (2009), in which they found that audit firm 
rotation made the auditor as well as the audit client adopt a less cooperative 
approach to the audit and auditor-client negotiations (Wang & Tuttle, 2009). This 
approach and perception of the audit would increase the impasses and stress for 
both parties.  
The IRBA listed the following objectives for the implementation of MAFR: 
1. The enhancing of auditor independence, which furthers their mandate of
protecting the public’s interests.
2. Engineering a correction for the market concentration of the audit services
industry, particularly by the ‘Big Four’ firms This measure would potentially
create more competitive environment.
3. Promote black-owned, mid-tier firms to transform the industry so that it is no
longer a white male-dominated industry.
SAICA and the IRBA have both centred their arguments along the lines of these 
objectives. In the discussions that ensued since the IRBA’s call for comment, there 
has been little consultation of academic sources, except for a few studies (Harber, 
2016b) (Harber & Willows, 2016). In an effort to portray these objectives from an 
academic viewpoint, the review of available literature is presented in line with the 
above stated objectives. It is hoped that presenting the literature in this way will act 
as a reference point when future scholars are investigating the academic evidence 
for the determination of this regulation 
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2.2.  Mandatory audit firm rotation as it relates to auditor independence 
and audit quality 
Independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession. As a result, its 
enhancement remains foremost in the mind for IRBA (2016b). An auditor’s 
independence is the most critical characteristic to consider when evaluating the 
credibility of the auditor’s report. The current system that is in place to ensure good 
audit quality and increased independence is mandatory audit partner rotation. 
On this matter, SAICA seemed to support the fact that there is an auditor 
independence problem in South Africa (SAICA, 2016a); however, later on SAICA 
members questioned whether there is actually an auditor independence problem 
(SAICA, 2016d). The members indicated that no evidence has been presented to 
support the lack of auditor independence. SAICA also called for more consultation 
before the implementation of MAFR, which seems to indicate that SAICA is in 
support of the current regulation of mandatory partner rotation at least for the 
present. This stance is perplexing as on the one hand, SAICA indicated there is a 
problem, yet on the other hand, the remedial action is not to be taken quickly and 
MAFR is not yet an option. It would be expected that swift action is taken to address 
a problem as critical as a lack of auditor independence.  
2.2.1.  Mandatory audit partner rotation 
Under mandatory audit partner rotation, the audit firm keeps the audit client although 
the audit engagement partner has to rotate “off” the client every five years (SAICA, 
2016c). The engagement partner is a very important person in the audit and all the 
audit decisions that involve judgement can be attributed to him/her (IAASB, 2009a). 
In addition, the audit partner also takes ultimate responsibility for the audit quality 
(IAASB, 2009b). 
Once auditors have developed more than just a working relationship with 
management, there is an increased likelihood that they may acquiesce to the 
influence of the management. This sense of familiarity can persuade the auditor to 
more client-preferred treatment of material misstatements (Bamber & Iyer, 2007). 
The other possibility is that auditors are likely to give in to management’s prodding. 
A further option is if the auditor were to raise an item of contention with management, 
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and take a hard line on the matter that management did not prefer this could result 
in the loss of a significant amount of income for the auditor (Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 
2014).  
An external auditor’s part in the corporate governance framework of a company is 
critical. The current regime in South Africa to manage auditor independence is 
mandatory audit partner rotation. Under this rule, audit partners must rotate off a 
client every five years. Longer auditor-client relationships have shown auditor 
complacency surrounding significant judgements made by management in their 
financial statements. 
The IRBA introduced mandatory audit partner rotation as a measure to maintain 
auditor independence and bring a “fresh look” to audit engagements. This method 
of regulation was favourable because it maintained client knowledge and overall 
audit quality, which had already been developed and gathered by the incumbent 
audit firm. Mandatory audit partner rotation accounts for the development of 
familiarity between auditor and client. Additionally, it brings a renewed sense of 
scepticism to the auditor and management relationship (Laurion, Lawrence, & 
Ryans, 2017).  
A study by Ball, Robin, and Wu (2015) indicated that indeed audit quality benefits 
from increased audit tenure, which supports the mandatory partner rotation as a 
viable option. The study found that long partner tenure had a negative effect on audit 
quality indicators (Ball, et al., 2015). This adds merit to the argument for mandatory 
partner rotation.  
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2.2.2.  The views of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors 
A few of the major concerns about auditor independence held by the IRBA are 
discussed next. The IRBA in their consultation paper on MAFR identified the threats 
to independence, as listed in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 IRBA’s concerns 
Adapted from IRBA, 2016b. 
The CFO of an audit client is usually in a position to exert significant influence over 
the preparation of the audit client’s financial statements on which the audit firm will 
express an opinion. This threat to independence is compounded by the fact that the 
audit firm that is performing the audit previously often employed key staff members 
who are now employed in the finance department. This sort of threat, which is 
caused by association, can also be found when members of governing bodies or 
audit committees were previously affiliated to the incumbent audit firm (IRBA, 
2016b, 2016c)  
With regard to long audit tenure, the IRBA had made it mandatory that all auditor 
reports on annual financial statements contain a disclosure on the number of years 















users of the annual financial statements would be in a position to make an informed 
decision. This measure, however, did not treat the cause of the auditor 
independence problem, that being audit tenure. The IRBA asserted that long audit 
tenure could lead to threats to independence. The IRBA also produced the following 
table: 
Table 2.1 Years of tenure 
Adapted from IRBA, 2016b. 
The JSE cited concerns about the tenure of audit firms. The IRBA cited the Public 
Investment Corporation as evidence (IRBA, 2016b). 
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It is interesting that Table 2.1, produced by the IRBA, does not account for the 
various mergers and acquisitions of audit firms over time. The audit firms in their 
current form have only been in existence for a short period of time (Cao, 2016). 
All of the arguments that were presented by the IRBA have at their basis one key 
idea, namely that increased audit tenure negatively affects the independence of an 
audit in general. 
In the report presented by the IRBA, there was no appeal made to academic 
literature (IRBA, 2016b). Hohenfels (2016) found that German investor confidence 
is lost once the audit tenure goes over 11 years. This indicates that the shareholder 
(investor) loses the same confidence in the efficacy of the audit firm after 11 years 
of audit tenure, because the investors reported a negative impact on audit quality at 
that time. Interestingly, that same study found that the confidence of that investor 
was the highest between year eight and nine of the audit tenure. Ball, et al. (2015) 
worked with a sample of 61 Austrian companies and found a positive correlation 
between audit quality and audit tenure up to six years. As a result, it seems that the 
IRBA’s argument has some support in literature. The government has promulgated 
a ten-year rotational rule and this also is encouraged by literature (IRBA, 2016c). 
2.2.3.  The academic research into mandatory audit rotations (firm and 
partner) 
It is extremely difficult to objectively quantify an auditor’s independence so that it 
can be a measure for research purposes. Therefore, auditor independence proves 
to be challenging to research. As a result, in the literature most studies use audit 
quality as a surrogate for auditor independence. The understanding is that if the 
auditor is independent there is an increased probability of high audit quality. The 
majority of studies in this field used models in which discretionary accruals, going 
concern options, modified audit opinions, or financial statement restatements were 
used as proxies for audit quality. In many studies, a combination of these proxies 
was used (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). 
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2.2.3.1. Alma mater or employment affiliations between auditors and the audit 
clients. 
An alma mater or employment affiliation occurs when an auditor leaves the employ 
of an audit firm and is employed by one of that audit firm’s clients (Lennox, 2005). 
In other words, the new employer of the individual auditor is the audit client. It makes 
sense for audit clients to hire such individuals because they are familiar with the 
accounting system and the business in general. A search was conducted to 
understand the prevalence of this behaviour in South Africa; however, due to a lack 
of research into the South African context, no academic literature in this regard was 
found. 
Alma mater affiliations are common in South Africa since the majority SAICA 
trainees (graduates that have exited university with a Certificate in the Theory of 
Accountancy (CTA) and are eligible to write the SAICA Initial tests of competence 
examination) become auditors, yet these auditors expect to spend their entire career 
in a financial management sector (SAICA, 2017).  
Auditors’ perceptions on whether such affiliations affect the audit quality are mixed 
(Lennox, 2005), but the users of financial statements feel that there is a decrease in 
the quality of an audit with the existence of an alma mater affiliation. 
A study performed in Canada and the United States utilised 3X1 factorial design on 
a sample of 140 audit managers. The study sought to understand whether their alma 
mater affliction of key staff such as the CFO would affect the audit manager’s 
perception of the audit client. Seventy-six percent of the audit managers revealed 
that if the audit partner became the CFO at the audit client, there is unlikely to be a 
significant impairment requested by the auditors. The reasoning behind this is that 
the audit managers understood that this audit partner would process the impairment 
voluntarily. The auditor’s level of confidence in the CFO indicates a familiarity bias. 
The study also investigated whether the audit manager’s level of confidence during 
the audit would increase if an audit partner became CFO, but no statistically 
significant data was found to support or refute this claim. Regardless, this study 
indicated that there is some form of impairment in the objectivity of audit managers 
because of the alma mater affiliation. It is however interesting to note that the data 
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does not clearly support the case for or against the existence of the alma mater 
affiliation (Favere-Marchesi & Emby, 2018).   
A US study conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s found that the majority 
(71,3%) of affiliations happen when an auditor is employed by their audit client. The 
study concluded that the probability of companies receiving clean audit opinions 
correlates to the executives being affiliated with audit firms currently performing the 
audit (Lennox, 2005). This finding concludes that affiliations between the auditor and 
the audit client executives can impair the audit quality; a view that is supported by 
the IRBA (2016b). 
Work conducted by Ahmad (2015) in Malaysia utilised a questionnaire sent out to 
professional investors and corporate loan officers. The study discovered that there 
is a perceived threat to independence when an auditor is employed at the client that 
they have audited. This threat was perceived to be more significant when the person 
is changing employment as a position of seniority at the audit firm (for example, a 
senior manager, or audit partner). The study further examined the situation of when 
an auditor changes employment and assumes responsibilities of financial statement 
preparation at their audit client. The finding was that in that situation the 
independence of the engagement team is more likely to be affected than if the new 
employee was appointed to a non-finance role (Ahmad, 2015). The understanding 
among investors was that the audit client had insight into the procedures and 
techniques used by the auditors and this made the client better equipped to conceal 
items in the financial information being audited. The Malaysian case is similar to 
South Africa in many ways, the most important being that both countries are 
developing economies. As a result, it could be accepted that what is happening in 
Malaysia is likely to happen in South Africa.  
It seems unlikely that alma mater affiliations can be removed entirely. It seems 
logical that a governing body member that is an alumnus of a specific audit firm 
would tend to promote their previous employer, if auditor rotations are ever 
discussed among the body. This tendency of governing body members to select 
audit firms with preference given to their previous employer has been proven in the 
United States (US) (Lennox & Park, 2007). 
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2.2.3.2 Long audit firm tenure as a negative effort on audit quality 
There is very little literature to support the opinion that an increased audit firm tenure 
decreases the audit quality or the auditor independence. In fact, academic literature 
on auditor tenure as it relates to audit quality has generally concluded that long 
auditor tenure does not impair audit quality (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). In fact, a strong 
link between audit firm tenure and conservatism or prudence exists for large audit 
clients. This link has not been found for smaller firms (Li, 2010). 
Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs (2013) studied partners’ perceptions of 
mandatory auditor rotation (MAR) as it relates to audit quality. Daugherty, et al. 
(2013) analysed the responses of 170 audit partners in the U.S. The sampling 
technique used was a convenience sampling method. This research showed that 
partners felt auditor rotation increased auditor independence although the partners 
felt that the rotation caused the loss of client-specific knowledge. It was also found 
that there was an unintentional decrease in the audit quality if the partner was 
required to audit a firm in a new industry. The reason for this decrease in quality 
was that the partner would require time to familiarise himself or herself with the new 
industry being audited (Daugherty, et al., 2013). 
2.2.3.3 Perceptions of investors and users. 
There is very little literature on the perception of investors and use of the financial 
statement as it relates to MAFR in South Africa. In general, this seems to be an 
under-researched topic in developing countries. Similarly, in the developed world 
there is still limited research on this topic.  
2.3. Audit firm concentration, competition and transformation in the 
auditing industry 
The last two objectives that are set out by the IRBA, that of increasing competition 
in the audit market and increasing the transformation of the industry are linked. The 
two objectives are dependent on each other for success. There is very likely 
research on the effects of MAFR as it relates to transformation and the bridging of 
the racial wage gap. As a result of the above reasons, these two objectives are 
considered together here.  
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The Big Four audit firms are widely accepted to be Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG and Ernst and Young (EY). Combined, 
these audit firms have the most revenue in the sector and have the most resources 
(Mohamed & Habib, 2010). The mid-tier firms are generally those that are able to 
handle large audits but do not have the same staff complement as the Big Four. The 
majority of mid-tier firms are international firms (Harber, 2016b). Small-tier firms are 
those that have less than five audit partners; they do not have the international 
footprint that the majority of mid-tier firms have.  
The IRBA indicates that only 4% the JSE listed companies are audited by audit firms 
outside of the 10 largest audit firms. At the time of IRBA’s statistic in 2016, there 
were 395 firms listed in the JSE. This market concentration is a threat to the stability 
of the country’s economy (IRBA, 2016b). MAFR was presented as a tool to allow 
‘non-Big Four’ audit firms to tender for, compete for, obtain the audits of these JSE 
listed companies, and thereby promote healthy competition and inclusion in the 
market. If auditors are not under pressure of market competition, they are not 
incentivised to self-regulate and thus maintain audit quality (Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2012). 
The reason for this is that there is no idea for an auditor to differentiate himself or 
herself in the market.  
The argument that mandatory audit firm rotation will allow smaller audit firms an 
opportunity to grow is not always the case. Research suggests that MAFR may lead 
to higher market concentration because large audit clients tend to choose one of the 
Big Four audit firms when rotating to their next audit firm. The reason for this is that 
the audit committees of the larger audit client may view mid-tier audit firms as lacking 
in capacity to deal with a large audit (European Commission (EC), 2010; Ewelt-
Knauer, Gold, & Pott, 2013).  
Businesses are becoming more internationally focused and as a result, there are 
more companies requiring financial statement audits. Audit committees and 
shareholders of these companies want a recognisable “name” conducting the audit. 
A globally recognised auditor adds credibility and improves a company’s ability to 
attract finance. The larger audit firms are perceived to have a specific level of audit 
quality and therefore they are more sought after. Therefore, the push for growth and 
globalisation creates substantial barriers for smaller audit firms to enter the audit 
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market (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercey, 2015; European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG), 2009). 
In addition, mandatory audit firm rotations may be restricted to only the Big Four 
audit firms, since some audit committees may perceive that small to medium-sized 
audit firms lack the necessary resources, expertise and capacity to deal with smooth 
rotations of large companies (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), 
2012). Furthermore, the requirements to perform a statutory audit, on a listed 
company, are onerous. In South Africa, there is mandatory compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standard for 
Auditing (ISA) along with the regulatory and KING IV obligations to report. These 
circumstances mean that the audit is more tedious and therefore it creates supplier 
concentration (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). 
In the early 2000s, DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000) conducted an investigation into 
the interplay between the audit industry concentration and auditor independence in 
China. One thousand, two hundred and twenty six listed companies on both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were observed. Multivariate panel data 
analysis was employed to analyse the audit opinions issued by the ten largest audit 
firms and this was compared to the smaller audit firms. The study concluded that 
larger auditors are more likely to be independent than smaller auditors. This study 
looked at situations when a smaller auditor is allowed to audit an entity that is 
disproportionately larger then itself. In the South African case, this finding would 
mean that there is a possibility of a decrease in auditor independence with the mass 
introduction of non-Big Four auditors into the listed audit client market (DeFond, et 
al., 2000).  
In South Africa, Harber’s (2016a) study was conducted by interviewing 14 audit 
partners in 2016. The audit partners viewed the IRBA’s measures with scepticism; 
they indicated that MAFR is most likely to improve audit quality. The exact way in 
which MAFR is used to decrease market concentration and increase transformation 
in the audit industry was unclear to the participants. It was interesting to note that 
there was disagreement between the partners about whether market concentration 
was a concern. This study is important because no person interviewed preferred a 
change in regulation to MAFR. With regard to the market concentration, in general 
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the partners concluded that it is unlikely for the audit committees and shareholders 
of large listed companies to award their audits to small (and in some cases even 
mid-tier) audit firms. The partners of the small audit firms even admitted to not 
having the expertise to complete a large listed company audit (Harber, 2016a; 
Harber & Willows, 2016). 
Harber and Willows (2016) found that audit partners felt that transformation needed 
to take place within the Big Four, with some participants even suggesting that 
currently the Big Four may be employing the majority of the black professionals in 
the industry. The study found that the connection between the implementation of 
MAFR and transformation of the audit industry did not seem evident to participants 
(Harber & Willows, 2016).  
It is interesting that many research has identified the global market concentration in 
the audit industry as a problem. Importantly, countries like Egypt and Malaysia are 
similar to South Africa because they are developing nations and struggle with 
economy problems similar to those of South Africa. A study in Egypt indicated that 
83% of listed companies prefer that the audit firm be a Big Four firm (Mohamed & 
Habib, 2010). A 2013 study in Malaysia found that the Big Four audit firms were 
auditing 73% of the entities listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Little academic research supports MAFR as a remedy for market concentration in 
the audit industry. On whether or not market concentration is remedied by the 
introduction of MAFR, Velte and Stiglbauer (2013) said: 
“It is vague, how the EC’s [European Commission’s] reforms for a 
concentration decrease, e.g. the introduction of a mandatory audit firm 
rotation, are connected to an increased audit quality. Instead, significant 
increasing transaction costs could be related…to price dumping 
strategies (low-balling) and endanger the audit quality”. 
2.4.  Mandatory audit firm rotation in other jurisdictions 
MAFR has been in existence for some time in both the developed and the 
developing world (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997). The South African economy has the 
challenge of being a developing economy in Africa. Despite this challenge, South 
Africa is one of the largest economies on the continent and until recently was ranked 
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higher that other African countries for auditing and reporting standards (World 
Economic Forum (WEF), 2018). It would thus be beneficial to look into the 
experiences of countries that implemented MAFR, and that are comparable with 
South Africa.  
A number of countries have implemented MAFR, with the following countries 
selected for review for this study: The first two countries selected were Italy and 
South Korea. Italy was one of the first countries to implement MAFR, which has 
been in effect in Italy since 1974 (Cameran, Prencipe, & Trombetta, 2016). The 
Italian regulation has had a number of changes, which have resulted in an advanced 
regulation being implemented currently (IFAC, 2017). South Korea also has a 
rotational rule that seems to be successful. Regardless of the fact that Italy and 
South Korea are considered developed countries and that Italy is in the European 
Union (EU), their cases are important to South Africa because the longevity of their 
implementation offers guidance for South Africa to develop a lasting solution. 
The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are an 
economic block comprising emerging and developing countries. These countries 
are similar on many important indicators such as population, gross domestic profit 
(GDP) and inequality. South Africa was invited to join the BRICS in 2010 (BRICS, 
2018). All BRICS countries have implemented MAFR to some extent. Studying the 
example and experience of South Africa’s contemporaries is the best predictor of 
how MAFR will affect our economy. Reliable and usable scholarly work from Russia 
has been extremely hard to find and, because of this dearth of literature, Russia has 
been excluded from this review. 
2.4.1. Italy 
Since mid-1974, MAFR has been required for listed companies in Italy. The 
coverage of company types that are included in this regulation has been steadily 
increasing over the last 40 years. In the mid-1980s, the rotational rule became 
mandatory for all listed companies (Cameran, et al., 2005). Italian listed companies 
need to be subject to both a retention and a rotation rule. The rule requires 
companies to retain an auditor for the first three years. That means that once the 
audit firm is appointed they cannot be removed for three years, regardless of the 
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audit opinion. There are some provisions to allow for removal in cases of negligence 
on the auditor’s part. After the initial three years, the audit must be subjected to a 
tender process; the previous auditor’s services can then be renewed for an 
additional three years. This renewal process can only happen twice with the same 
audit firm. This results in a potential audit tenure of nine years, after which the entity 
must employ a new audit firm (Corbellaa,Florioa, Gotti, & Mastrolia, 2015; Cameran, 
et al., 2005; SAICA, 2016b). In 2006, the three-year tendering rule was relaxed, 
although the nine-year mandatory rotation remains. 
A recent study in Italy used a time series of 20 years (1985-2004) and had 1184 
observations of the Milan Stock Exchange. The study found that auditors were less 
conservative in their estimates over the first two three-year periods. This means that 
the auditor was more likely to agree with management’s estimates between years 
one to six of the auditor-client relationship. The study found that a possible reason 
for this is because the auditor wants to maintain good relations with management 
as the auditor might then be appointed to the audit again in the future, but in the 
third three-year period (from years 7 to 9 of the audit relationship) the auditor would 
have to be mandatorily rotated. This research seems to support the notion that the 
knowledge of a rotation makes the auditor act more independently.  
2.4.2. South Korea 
Companies that were registered on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (KOSDAQ) were required in 2003 to rotate audit firms every six years, 
although with exceptions (Cameran, et al., 2005). The implementation date was 
from 2006, and was applied prospectively (Kwon, et al., 2014). After extensive 
research and anecdotal comments from stakeholders, the mandatory audit firm 
rotation policy was abolished in 2010 (Kwon, et al., 2014). The reason advanced 
was that the costs of constantly rotating audit firms were vast and difficult to quantify, 
and the effectiveness of this measure was initially overestimated (SAICA, 2016b).  
2.4.3. Brazil 
Fraud and corruption in Brazil during the late 1990s caused the government together 
with the Brazilian regulatory body (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM]) to 
implement MAFR for the banking sector (Implemented in 1996). The requirement 
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was later extended to all listed companies in 1999, with the enforcement date of 
2001 (Cameran, et al., 2005; SAICA, 2016b). Owing to perceived disadvantages 
with the five-year rotational period implementation, the requirement was repealed 
for all companies in 2008. However, in 2012, the CVM implemented the rotational 
rule for non-bank listed companies and companies with a public interest (SAICA, 
2016b). The rule requires that if a company has an audit committee then the entity 
need only rotate every ten years. Without an audit committee, the company must 
rotate auditors every five years (Bronson, Harris, & Whisenant, 2016). This change 
may indicate that importance could be allocated to better corporate governance as 
opposed to auditor rotations. Brazil’s example underlines the significance of 
research like this one in South Africa (Bronson, et al., 2016).  
2.4.4.  India 
In April of 2017, the Indian government officially implemented mandatory audit firm 
rotation for all public interest companies and certain private companies (selection of 
private companies is determined by criteria in the Indian Companies Act) (The 
Companies Bill (Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), 2012). The rotational period 
was for five years with a few exceptions for banks (4-year rotational period) and 
provident funds (2-year rotational period).  
Shah (2018) used all companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) with a 
regression methodology to look at audit quality, MAFR and institutional ownership. 
The hypotheses of the study tested whether the implementation of MAFR increased 
audit quality, and the corrolation between MAFR implementation with an increase in 
institutional ownership. The premise (based on literature) was that institutional 
investors would recognise the increased audit quality and therefore increase their 
investment. The study found that MAFR increased the quality of discretionary 
accruals, but there was insignficant evidence between the other proxies for audit 
quality and MAFR. Therefore it was concluded that there was an insignificant 
change to audit quality. The study also concluded that there was no relationship 
between MAFR and increased institutional investing (Shah, 2018).  
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2.4.5  China 
China's unique ecomony and business environmnental features provide a setting in 
which it is possible to comprehensively understand the effect of audit firm rotation 
in an economy similar to South Africa. In mid 2003, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
of China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) together effectively placed a firm rotational requirement for all State-
owned companies.  
In Firth, Rui, & Wu, (2012), a time series from 1997 to 2005 was used – with a total 
of 213 mandatory audit firm rotations on the Chinese main-board. This study used 
the probability of receiving a modified audit opinion (MAO) as a proxy for audit 
quality. The study tested the probabiliy of receiving a MAO when there is no change 
in the audit parter or the audit firm as their control. The study investigated the 
probability of recieving a MOA under the case of audit partner rotation and under 
mandatory audit firm rotation. This study concluded that there was an increase in 
the probability of receiving a MAO under both audit partner and audit firm rotation. 
The increase under audit partner rotation proved to be significant statistically, but 
unfortunately the increase under MAFR proved insignificant for statisitcal purposes 
(Firth, et al., 2012).  
2.5.  Arguments for and against mandatory audit firm rotation 
The IRBA regularly performs inspections on the audit quality of various audit 
engagements, with the results indicating that 43% of all engagements inspected had 
significant deficiencies with regard to the ethical requirements. The significant 
deficiencies are defined in International Standards on Auditing 220 as inadequate 
or insignificant audit evidence to support the audit opinion (IAASB, 2009b). The 
IRBA asserted that the cause of these deficiencies was a breakdown of auditor 
independence and a lack of legal compliance (IRBA, 2015, 2016b). There are 
numerous reasons that could be forwarded for a lack of auditor independence, but 
all reasons have a causal link to audit firm tenure.  
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The IRBA does not release details of the inspection findings apart from a sanitised 
inspection report summary every two years. The release for this is the sensitive and 
confidential nature of the inspection reports and the companies involved. 
Client familiarity and reliance on prior year audit work is an independence deficiency 
brought about by long audit firm tenure (Lu & Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). Many in fact 
fear that long audit tenures may result in the auditor being reluctant to effectively 
question suspicious accounting practices, or even being complacent in following up 
on adverse audit findings (Barton, 2002). 
Some of the disadvantages of MAFR that have already been introduced are an 
increase in the transaction costs and low-balling when tendering for an audit. The 
arguments for and against MAFR are now reviewed. Kwon, et al. (2014) looked at 
1306 companies on the KOSDAQ market, a regression analysis between the audit 
fees, auditing hours and the implementation of MAFR. It was found that there was 
statistcal significance to support an increase in the audit fees with the 
implementation of MAFR. In a South African study by Grant, Harber, and Minter 
(2018), voluntary audit rotations were investigated over a ten-year period. Grant, et 
al. (2018) selected a sample from the JSE by eliminating companies that had not 
changed their auditors within the ten years from 2000 to 2011. A regression was 
performed on the fees. Findings were that immediately after a rotation (year 1 after 
audit firm rotation), there was a decrease in the audit fees. Unfortunately, from year 
two or the second year after the rotation, the fees increased higher then the average 
increase in audit fees across the JSE. Therefore, the change in audit firm may have 
a short-term saving but in the longer term there is a loss. Both Kwon, et al. (2014) 
and Grant, et al. (2018) are recent studies that demonstrate the existence of higher 
costs after an audit rotation, which confirms the existing literature (Bronson, et al., 
2016; Cao, 2016; Cameran, et al., 2016; Ewelt-Knauer, et al., 2013). These 
arguments are important for the framing and understanding of this research. These 
arguments are also used to inform the design of the research instruments as 
indicated in Chapter 3.  
The debate on MAFR has been raging since the late 1970s, with voices from 
academics, regulators and practitioners alike (Dattin, 2017). The fact that the 
auditor’s profitability is dependent on the auditor obtaining and retaining clients, 
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fuels this debate further. Statista GmbH is a German-based statistics and market 
research database and this company has long been collecting data on professional 
services firms in the accounting sectors. In 2018, Statista produced agraph (See 
Table 2.2) to illustrate the revenue streams of the four largest audit firms on a global 
scale. Similar statistics from a South African perspective have not been available 
(Statista, 2018). 
Table 2.2 Revenue of the Big Four accounting/audit firms worldwide, by 
function (in billion US dollars), as at 30 June 2018 
Adapted from Statista, 2018. 
2.5.1.  Improvement in the audit quality 
Academic research reveals the positive benefits of mandatory firm rotation on the 
auditor’s independence, especially in cases of high market concentration such as 
South Africa. 
It seems logical that an increase in auditor tenure would result in a decrease in 
auditor independence. Jackson, Moldrich, and Roebuck (2008) discovered that an 
increased audit tenure increases the likelihood of expressing a going concern option 
(Jackson, et al., 2008). The study did not draw conclusions on the validity of those 
going concern opinions. The research failed to find statistical significance for the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and audit tenure. These are proxies 
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Previous studies prove that propensity to issue a going concern opinion to an entity 
in financial distress, the size of discretionary accruals and earning quality are some 
indicators of audit quality (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997; Gunny & Zhang, 2013). 
Propensity to issue an invalid going concern opinion is clearly an indication of 
impaired auditor independence (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997). Discretionary 
accruals are also referred as provisions or contingent liabilities, entities are not 
required to raise all liabilities, although unrecognised these may fall due in the future. 
The thought behind this measure is that the greater the number of discretionary 
accruals, the more objective the audit was (DeAngelo, 1981). Earnings quality is the 
ability to use reported earnings to predict future earnings (DeAngelo, 1981). These 
speak to the quality of audited financial statements. Numerous studies assess audit 
quality using these as a basis, with mixed results. Here in this paper, only a few are 
considered. Also, an increase in audit fees does not increase the audit quality.  
In light of this, it is interesting to note that Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) found a 
relationship between audit tenure, discretionary accruals, propensity to issue going 
concern opinions and earnings quality. They further concluded that audit firm 
rotation might affect one variable of audit quality, but not audit quality as a whole 
(Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). Research in other parts of the world supports these 
results (Chen, Jin, & Lin, 2004; Ncolaescu, 2014). 
With the implementation of MAFR, the IRBA, just like other regulators, may 
anticipate positive market reactions due to the perceived audit quality and the 
improved independence in appearance (Ewelt-Knauer, et al., 2013). However, 
research proves that investors are not concerned with audit tenure as much as 
perceived. In addition, evidence proves that in other jurisdictions the markets have 
reacted negatively to MAFR (Reid & Carcello, 2017). Investors and stakeholders in 
countries with advanced shareholder/stakeholder protection do not primarily rely on 
an external audit for protection of their interests (Reid & Carcello, 2017). The jury is 
still out, as to whether South Africa’s investor protection legislation is sufficient.  
2.5.2.  Decrease in audit fees 
It would be logical to assume that the increase in activity in the audit market would 
increase the competition among audit firms (SAICA, 2016a), resulting in a decrease 
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of audit fees. Under a voluntary rotation regime, it has been found that the audit fees 
increase on an annual basis (Ncolaescu, 2014). The forcing of audit clients to find 
new auditors after a specific period may change the audit tendering process 
dramatically. Low-balling is an instance in which the auditor is tendering deliberately 
under tenders or quotes in the tender process (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997). The 
low-baller aims for their tender to be the most attractive to the client. The assumption 
is that the client will contract with the lowest priced audit firm. In the initial years of 
the audit, the firm will invest significantly in the audit client. In the later years of the 
audit relationship, (that is the relationship between the auditor and the audit client), 
the auditor will aim to recoup the initial outlay of resources through inflated audit 
fees. The later years of the audit relationship are fees recovered. This may be 
because the auditor is not to be concerned about the rapport with the client; the 
auditor knows that soon the client will be forced to look for another audit firm. This 
practice simply moves the initial setup costs from the first year of the audit 
relationship (when they are incurred) to later years (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997; 
SAICA, 2016a). Ncolaescu (2014). It may be concluded that audit fees under the 
mandatory rotation rule increase collectively when compared to a voluntary rotation 
system (Ncolaescu, 2014).  
This has not been reconciled with the fact that an audit committee is unlikely to 
accept higher audit fees easily (Imhoff, 1978) and as mentioned above, an increase 
in the audit fees is not indicative of an increase in audit quality (Cameran, et al., 
2016). In addition, the application of auditing standards related to using the working 
papers of the previous auditor is dealt with in Section 4.4.  
2.5.3.  Matching of audit costs with audit benefits 
There are other non-quantifiable costs, such as the loss of audit client knowledge 
when one audit firm replaces another. This audit client knowledge is the professional 
relationship and understanding that the audit firm possesses in relation to the audit 
client (Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar, & Carrera, 2009). The cost to the audit 
client’s staff is that the new audit firm may deem it necessary for them (the audit 
client’s staff) to re-provide supporting evidence that the previous auditor would have 
possessed. This situation can decrease the audit client staff’s morale. There is also 
the opportunity cost of not being able to specialise in a particular sector because of 
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consistent rotation. In some cases, individual auditors may relocate or change 
employer in order to obtain better industry exposure (Arrunada & Paz-Arez, 1997). 
2.6.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, the academic literature available was reviewed. Research into the 
current regulation of mandatory audit partner rotation was presented and it was 
found that the effects are limited. MAFR’s effect of auditor independence was found 
to be positive. The IRBA’s views were analysed and the conclusion was that a strong 
argument is being made for the need to improve auditor independence in South 
Africa. The IRBA, because of their mandate, has presented MAFR as a solution. 
The disadvantages of long auditor tenure were explored and multiple negative 
effects were confirmed. The link between MAFR, a reduction of market 
concentration, and the transformation of the audit industry was found to be very 
weak. Next, a review of MAFR in selected countries was conducted. In addition, 
broad arguments that have entered the debate on MAFR were presented.  
The literature that was reviewed indicated that there is a lack of academic research 
on MAFR, especially in South Africa. There seems to be a lack of academic research 
on the opinions of academics and audit clients in particular. As a result, this study 
included those groups in addition to auditors. Furthermore, the majority of research 
deals with the effect of MAFR implementation, with little research addressing the 
plans or factors that can result in the successful implementation of MAFR. This study 
was tailored to uncover the possible strategies and plans that can result in MAFR 
being a success. 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the recent literature on audit rotations was reviewed. The literature 
review was conducted in a descriptive manner. The chapter reviewed the effects of 
and reasons for MAFR and the arguments put forward by its proponents and 
opponents.  
The literature review found that an abundance of academic literature focused on the 
effects of MAFR. However, little research was found on the factors and actions of 
role-players that would make MAFR a workable solution. In addition, the details of 
MAFR in a South African context only became apparent after the IRBA had 
announced the rotational rule in 2016 (IRBA, 2016b). There seems to be a lack of 
research on volunteer audit rotations and the strategies that prove successful under 
current regulation. As a result, there is a need to undertake research in this field. 
This research  addresses the successfulness of audit rotations and will contribute 
towards the existing literature. Audit firm rotation research falls within the ambit of 
business research. Business research is undertaken because there is an 
unresolved problem in the industry (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Business research is 
geared toward concluding on findings that would yield workable solutions to a 
problem (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
The lack of evidence that MAFR would lead to an increase in auditor independence, 
audit quality and competition in the audit market, is simply in opposition to the spirit 
of the legislation. This study made use of the grounded theory method set out by 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013) to solve the perceived problems with audit firm rotations 
– with the intention for this to result in a contribution to the existing knowledge.
Having identified the broad problem area above, the next step was to formulate a
problem statement.
3.2.  Objectives of the study 
In an effort to identify the strategies that can be implemented to deal with MAFR, 
this study looked at key role-players in these strategies and the impact of their 
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actions (new external audit firm, previous audit firm and audit client). In addition, the 
study also looked at factors that will affect the strategies. In considering both the key 
role-players and the key factors, it was expected that a picture of the strategy would 
emerge. 
 In line with the above, the research objectives is here restated:: 
• To establish the role of the new external auditor in successful audit firm
rotations in KwaZulu-Natal.
• To establish the role of the previous external auditor in successful audit firm
rotations in KwaZulu-Natal.
• To establish the role of the audit client in successful audit firm rotations in
KwaZulu-Natal.
• To establish the key factors in successful audit firm rotations in KwaZulu-
Natal.
3.5 Grounded theory 
The grounded theory methodology enables a researcher to understand the 
perspectives of the participants on the area that is being studied. The grounded 
theory methodology allows the researcher to engage with the participants, because 
this methodology values the descriptive narrative of the participant (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2015). 
Grounded theory methodology was discovered in the 1960s. It is formally from the 
fields of medical science. This methodology does not seek to achieve 
generalisability by finding a research sample that represents the population. Instead, 
it aims to understand and explain a given phenomenon with the use of empirical 
data (Gorra, 2007). 
3.5.1  Stages in grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory most commonly uses the in-depth interview to collect data. The 
sampling method that is utilised is called theoretical sampling. This is when the 
researcher decides on specific criteria that are used to select the sample. In this 
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study, the number of audit firm rotations that participants were involved in, was used 
as the selection criteria (Charmaz, 2014).  
As grounded theory is an iterative process, the data was being analysed as it was 
being collected (Gorra, 2007). Once the interviews are transcribed, the researcher 
must code the interviews. Open coding was used in this study. Open coding is a 
process in which the researcher reads the transcript on a line-by-line basis, and 
places conceptual labels on ideas that reoccur. Detailed line-by-line coding helps 
the researcher open up the data to interpretation (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). This 
coding process was repeated twice to refine the codes and to limit perception bias. 
This second look at coding is called focused coding (Gorra, 2007). 
After coding a number of transcripts, the researcher would notice that the codes 
have similar characteristics or themes. These are called concepts. As the concepts 
begin to grow, they are grouped into categories. There is rarely quantifying of data 
in the grounded theory; however, counting the number of frequencies of a given 
category can reflect what is in the minds of the participants. These categories are 
then used to develop an understanding of the subject matter. This understanding is 
referred to as a theory. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 The stages in the grounded theory 
(Adapted from Gorra, 2007) 
3.6.  Research design 
The research design is the plan for the collection and analysis of the data. These 
processes are informed by the research objectives (Ruiz-Barbadillo, et al., 2009). 
The experiences of practitioners would illuminate the challenges and difficulties in 
the implementation of audit firm rotations. The practitioners would indicate the 
unexpected problems that would arise in this difficult time. Analysis of this produces 
information that establishes the reasons for the success of the implementation of 
audit firm rotation in KwaZulu-Natal.  
3.6.1.  Why KwaZulu-Natal? 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) as a province is the second largest contributor to the South 
African GDP. KZN contributed 16% to the South African GDP in 2016 (Statistics 
South Africa, 2017). Whereas the Gauteng province is dominated by the financial 
services and mining sectors, the KZN market is weighted towards the manufacturing 
sector (Trade and Investment KZN, 2017). These particular characteristics of KZN 






mean that the study of the KZN economy is important and that evidence from other 
provinces may not necessarily hold true in KZN. By this study, investigating KZN will 
expand the current literature and contribute in a meaningful way to the 
understanding of MAFR in South Africa.  
3.7.  Qualitative research 
In this section, the qualitative research design is discussed. The focus is on data 
collection, interview structure and design, sample and population size and statistical 
analysis.  
3.7.1.  Data collection 
In-depth interviews are a data collection tool that allows the researcher to obtain 
lessons and insights from the personal experiences of the interviewees. This 
method of data collection is the most appropriate to obtain data from the personal 
experience of an individual. However, a drawback of employing interviews for this 
study is that audit professionals do not have time in their schedule for an interview 
and the participants are in different geographic locations across KZN. This was 
overcome by means of telephonic interviews (Rajaram, 2016).  
3.7.2.  Interview instrument 
An interview was a well-suited way to obtain research data from busy audit 
professionals that would meet the research objectives of this study. The interview 
used was a semi-structured interview. The schedule developed to be used in this 
data collection was designed to yield feedback from audit practitioners that relate to 
the research objectives.  
All the interviews were conducted in person or telephonically. Each interview lasted 
between one to one and half hours. With the express consent of all interviewees, 
the interview was recorded for analysis purposes. As a result of the obvious 
confidentially and ethical requirements, none of the audit firms, auditors’ personal 
names, or audit client names will ever be disclosed in this or any other research 
output that uses those recordings as data. Furthermore, those recordings will only 
be used for purposes of academic research.  
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Open-ended questions were utilised in the interviews as this allowed participants to 
answer questions freely, which helped yield rich honest responses. Questions 1 to 
6 obtained demographic information from interviewees. The rest of the questions 
were based on the results of the literature review.  
Table 3.1 Demonstration of how the questions in the questionnaire are aligned 
to the research objectives 
Objectives Question 
To establish the role of the 
incumbent external auditor in 
successful audit firm rotation in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
To establish the role of the 
previous external auditor in 
successful audit firm rotation in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
To establish the role of the audit 
client in successful audit firm 
rotation in KwaZulu-Natal.  
Question 11. What role does the following 




d. The audit client?
Question 12. What do you believe is the 
greatest determinant of a successful or 
“smooth” rotation? Please explain your 
choice. 
To establish the key factors in 
successful audit firm rotation in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Question 12. What do you believe is the 
greatest determinant of a successful or 
“smooth” rotation? Please explain your 
choice. 
Question 13. Can you provide your opinion 
on the following alternatives? 
a. Mandatory Audit Tendering (MAT), as
opposed to MAFR.
b. Joint Audits (Joint Audit Firms).
c. Rotating the senior management of the
audit team, not simply the engagement
partner.
Question 14. Do you foresee any direct and 
indirect consequences, including any 
unintended consequences, of IRBA moving 
towards MAFR? 
Question 15. What strategies would you 
implement in order to deal with MAFR? 
(researcher composed) 
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3.7.3.  Sample frame and size 
The interviews in this study were intended to stimulate discussion around the topic 
of MAFR. The personal experience of the audit practitioners offers particular insights 
into the factors that will result in success for audit practitioners. The population that 
was analysed in this study was professionals involved in audit that would be affected 
by the implementation of MAFR. Qualitative research offers a subjective opinion of 
a fewer number of people although the data collected is more persuasive (Rajaram, 
2016). As a result of the MAFR rule being applicable to JSE listed entities only, 
another characteristic of the population was that the professionals must have had 
experience in conducting audits on JSE listed entities (Harber, 2016b).  
Judgement in the selection of audit professionals was utilised. When extracting data 
from knowledgeable experts a purposive sampling technique is the most effective 
(Harber, 2016b). 
3.7.3.1  Population 
The IRBA is the only body in South Africa that can offer licences to Registered 
Auditors (RA), and these are the only practitioners who can sign off on annual 
financial statements of a public interest company (RSA, 2008). A database is 
administered by the IRBA and can be utilised as a sample frame for undertaking 
research. A full database of RAs is not available to the public, although searching 
for registration status of an RA can be attempted on the IRBA website. The IRBA 
office was directly contacted, and as of July 2018, there were 431 RAs registered in 
the KwaZulu-Natal region. The IRBA did not respond to requests to utilise this 
database to select the interviewees. This set the population size for the auditors.  
As the MAFR regulation is limited to JSE listed audit clients, the population for the 
sample of audit clients was to be the total number of JSE listed clients in KwaZulu-
Natal. In order to determine if a company is a KwaZulu-Natal JSE listed company 
the registered office of the company was considered as the determining factor. A 
thorough evaluation of the JSE website was conducted, looking specifically for the 
registered offices that are situated in KwaZulu-Natal. As at July 2018, 24 companies 
were identified. All companies were contacted to obtain permission to include their 
staff in this study.  
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3.7.3.2. Factors considered in determining the sample size 
With qualitative research, unlike quantitative research, there is no definite equation 
to determine the sample size. Charmaz (2014) and Charmaz (2006), who has 
contributed to the discussion on qualitative sample sizes, indicated that studies that 
have modest aims would be able to achieve a representative sample quicker than 
a study that does not (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). For example, investigating the general 
impact of MAFR on the South African economy in general would require a larger 
sample size than this study, which investigated the strategies used in the KwaZulu-
Natal market.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduced the idea that a qualitative sample size needs 
to be based on saturation of the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To this end, they 
added that saturation could be identified when adding more interviewees to a study 
does not add new perspectives to the research data.  
In this study, saturation became evident by the general agreement between 
participants on the topics discussed, despite the fact that the interviews were 
conducted separately and the results were kept confidential. It is also interesting to 
know that many of the determinations or findings, which are presented in Chapter 
4, were agreed on by over 50% of participants. In addition, when analysing the sixth 
interview of the auditors and the second interview of the audit clients, the responses 
seemed very similar in essence. Saturation in this study could be demonstrated by 
the fact that the context and real meaning of the topics discussed were gauged from 
each interviewee (as will be discussed in Chapter 4).  
Morse (2000), together with a number of other research, indicated that the data 
collection methods are key in the determination of the sample size (Morse, 2000; 
Lee, Woo, & Mackenzie, 2002; Jette, Grover, & Keck, 2003). Lee, et al. (2002) 
further suggested that the studies that utilise in-depth interviews would be able to 
use smaller sample sizes (Lee, et al., 2002).  
In-depth interviews were conducted in this study and therefore the study benefitted 
from gaining saturation quickly. In addition, the grounded theory methodology 
utilised to study the phenomenon of MAFR implementation made it easy to identify 
the saturation point.  
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Since qualitative studies are based on determining factors, many studies are 
reluctant to indicate specific sample sizes for qualitative research (Mason, 2010). 
Many studies find this lack of guidance a frustration, as they believe such guidance 
would be valuable in suggesting and justifing sample sizes (Guest, Bunce, & 
Johnson, 2006). This study assessed how professionals that are involved in audits 
are dealing with the phenomenon of MAFR. This study also used the grounded 
theory metholodogy. For this type of study, Creswell (1998, p. 64) indicated that 
between five and 30 interviewees are sufficent. Morse (1994, p. 225) recommended 
no less then six and up to 30 interviews. It should be noted, however, that both 
authors stressed that these numbers are not “set in stone”, rather they must be used 
as loose guidelines (Creswell, 1998; Morse, 1994). 
This study included a total sample of ten interviewees. Seven interviewees were 
auditors (population 431) and three were audit clients (population 24). As a result of 
the analysis, as presented in Chapter 4, saturation was assumed to be achieved.  
3.7.3.3. Sample selection 
In order to understand an individual’s experience within an area of research, in-
depth interviews with experts is recommended as a data collection method (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2015). An auditor and audit clients, being experts in this area of 
research, would have a high degree of auditing skill and financial knowledge. Most 
importantly, experts in this study have been involved in multiple audit rotations. Such 
an experienced accounting practitioner would have adequate first-hand knowledge 
on what the key roles and factors are to a smooth and easy audit firm rotation. With 
the number of audit firm rotations set to increase, this knowledge is invaluable. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the rate of audit firm rotations is very low throughout 
South Africa including KwaZulu-Natal. As such, various audit firms were directly 
contacted, to enquire of the number of audit firm rotations the firm had been involved 
in, and their willingness to participate in this study. From the firms that agreed, 36 
auditors who were most involved in and experienced with these above-mentioned 
audit firm rotations were contacted in order to understand their skills and experience, 
and thus assess if they would be willing to participate in this study. The criteria 
utilised in the assessment were purely based on the number of previous audit firm 
rotations that the individual had been involved in. Fifteen audit practitioners were 
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identified as having the skills sought after for this study. These were the practitioners 
that were involved in the highest number of audit firm rotations, in their respective 
audit firms. Only seven out of these fifteen agreed to participate in this study (auditor 
1 [A1] to auditor 7 [A7]).  
Identifying and attracting audit clients to participate in this study proved to be very 
difficult, because there is no way of identifying all the audit clients that have rotated 
audit firms recently or regularly for that matter. After contacting SAICA and JSE 
limited, in an effort to identify audit clients that would be affected by MAFR, 24 audit 
clients in the KwaZulu-Natal region were identified after a search of the JSE website. 
All these audit clients were contacted; however, only three agreed to participate in 
this study (audit client 1 [AC1] to audit client 3 [AC3]).The seven auditors and three 
audit clients made ten participants in this study. 
3.7.4.  Qualitative statistical analysis 
Before each interview commenced, the study’s aim and the interview procedure 
were explained to the interviewee. All interviews were recorded on a digital voice 
recorder. The interviews were transcribed, making use of the interviewer’s notes as 
well as the audio recording of the interview. The interview was transcribed by a paid 
research assistant, with the ethical requirements and transcription procedures not 
only being demonstrated to the research assistant but also given to the assistant in 
writing. Daugherty, et al. (2013) promoted a style of transcription called intelligent 
verbatum, which is the preferred style of transcription for academic research as it is 
very compatible with Nvivo analysis (Daugherty, et al., 2013; Gorra, 2007). 
Therefore, this style was utilised in this study. The transcriptions were then analysed 
to determine possible themes that emerged from the practitioners’ responses. The 
common themes were summarised with the use of word frequency tables and word 
trees. Nvivo software was utilised during open coding and categorising. The 
software was used to produce results that are more meaningful.  
The Nvivo software helped to manage and analyse the interview data. For example, 
once the interviews had been coded, all the code references could be viewed 
together for clear interpretation. 
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3.8.  Validity and reliability 
Validity addresses the need for the research instrument to measure concepts that 
are relevant to the answering of the research questions (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001).  
Content validity deals with how well the instruments can act as a representative 
sample for what is being measured (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). The interview schedule 
was assessed for content validity and these were found to have high content validity. 
Construct validity deals with how the instruments measure an event that cannot be 
directly observed, but is known to exist (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). The interview 
schedule was reviewed by the supervisor of this study. Five academics from the 
School of Management, Information Technology Systems, and Governance at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal reviewed the interview schedule. These academics 
have had extensive experience in conducting research with the use of interviews. 
The academics were asked to review the interview schedule generally but pay 
specific attention to understandability, ambiguity, and grammatical correctness. 
All participants were sent a copy of the transcription so that they could review and 
confirm that the transcription accurately reflects the interview.  
3.9.  Ethical considerations 
A letter of permission was obtained from all audit firms and all audit clients that were 
used for contacting the individual participants. The letters cannot be disclosed due 
to confidentiality reasons. The ethical clearance reference number is 
HSS/0808/018M; this was obtained from the ethics office at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (Appendix A). Informed consent was obtained from all individual 
participants. Specific consent was obtained for the audio recording of the interviews. 
All interviewees were assured of anonymity and the aim and objectives of the study 
were explained before the interviews.  
3.10.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, grounded theory was discussed and its suitability for the 
phenomenon under study: the strategies that can be implemented in KwaZulu-Natal 
to deal with MAFR. This chapter also discussed the sample determination and its 
appropriateness. An outline of the method used to analyse this data collected was 
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defended. In Chapter 4, the results of that analysis are presented. In addition, that 
chapter will discuss the gleanings from the understanding of the data.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
4.1. Introduction 
The research methodology for this study was outlined in the previous chapter. An 
argument was made for the proposed qualitative approach utilised in this research. 
In this chapter, the results of the research findings are presented and analysed. The 
study encompassed individual, in-depth interviews with accountants in practice, 
both in audit services and financial management sectors. These sectors were 
selected as they are the most affected when there are audit firm rotations. This 
places practitioners from these sectors in a position to identify and address matters 
that may arise in an audit firm rotation. Therefore, this qualitative research was 
grounded in studying specialist knowledge of a small group of individuals that 
understand auditing in South Africa well. All of the participants have been involved 
in a minimum of four rotations within their career, with the average number of 
rotations for the sample group selected being 14,3. 
The analysis of the research data was performed by paying careful attention to the 
research objectives. This was done to ensure that the data presented below could 
be related back to the research objectives to ensure that the link between these is 
clear. The role of the incumbent auditor was explored which included the 
understanding of the auditor independence and the individual groups in the audit 
team of the incumbent audit. The role of the previous auditor and the audit client 
were then analysed. The above-mentioned analyses are presented in this chapter 
as well as other factors that were identified by the experts. However, firstly the 
demographic details of the participants are presented in order to place the results 
that are to follow in better context. 
4.2.  Demographic data of participants 
As per the interview schedule (Appendix B), the first eight questions concerned the 
demographic profile of the participants in this study. This was done to understand 
the skill, experience, and perspectives of the various participants. These questions 
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sought to obtain the age, gender, years of experience, and the number of rotations 
in which the participants had been involved.  
Table 4.1 Demographic profile of study participants 
CHARACTERISTIC FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
AGE 
25-34 7 70% 
35-44 2 20% 
45-54 1 10% 
Total 10 100% 
GENDER 
Female 3 30% 
Male 7 70% 
Total 10 100% 
RACE 
African 3 30% 
Indian 4 40% 
White 3 30% 




















(see below) 1 10% 
Total 10 100% 
EDUCATION 





Doctoral Degree 1 10% 
Total 10 100% 
(researcher composed) 
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As per Table 4.1, the majority of the participants were between the ages of 25 to 34. 
Given this age, this group is most likely to be affected by the MAFR because at the 
time of implementation this group is lightly to be in leadership roles. The majority of 
participants were male, however, there seemed to be an even split between the 
races. One participant responded not applicable to professional body accreditation, 
as the position that this participant holds does not require a professional body 
accreditation. This participant works at an audit firm therefore this study classifies 
the participant as an auditor. The educational experience of the participants 
indicated that the vast majority (9/10) had a post-graduate qualification at the time 
of the study.  
4.2.1.  Experience of participants 
The experience of the participants for this study is displayed in Table 4.2. 








Years of experience 
in the accounting 
profession 
Auditor 1 (A1) 4 Small-tier 6 years 
Auditor 2 (A2) 7 Big Four 19 years 
Auditor 3 (A3) 25 Medium-tier 16 years 
Auditor 4 (A4) 30 Medium-tier 13 years 
Auditor 5 (A5) 9 Small-tier 9 years 
Auditor 6 (A6) 20 Big Four 10 years 
Auditor 7 (A7) 30 Big Four 22 years 
Audit Client 1 
(AC1) 10 
JSE Listed audit 
client (Big Four 
auditor) 
6 years 
Audit Client 2 
(AC2) 4 
JSE Listed audit 
client (Big Four 
auditor) 
6 years 
Audit Client 3 
(AC3) 4 
JSE Listed audit 
client (Big Four 
auditor) 
6 years 
Average 14.3 N/a 11.3 
(researcher composed) 
As demonstrated by Table 4.2, the average number of rotations among the 
participants was 14.3 audit firm rotations. This number is significant given the poor 
number of rotations in South Africa. The average years of practice in the accounting 
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profession was 11.3 years, with the least experience participant having work for six 
years as an accountant. Among the auditors there was an even split between the 
different audit firm tiers (3 auditors from the Big Four, with 2 each from medium and 
small tier firms). As explained in Chapter 3, it was extremely difficult to find audit 
clients that have the required skills and that were willing to participate in this 
research. Therefore, the only audit clients that were utilised were individuals from 
JSE listed entities. Consequently, because of the significant experience in the audit 
services market or with auditors, it is logical that these interviewees would enable 
an understanding of the key roles and salient factors that affect an audit firm rotation. 
It was also logical the participants would be able to assist in identifying interventions 
that can make the audit firm rotation process easier. 
4.3.  Incumbent auditor’s role in MAFR 
Within a given audit team there are usually different groups of people that have 
differing roles. A traditional audit team comprised the engagement partner, the 
engagement manager, audit trainees and the auditor’s experts or internal audit of 
the client. As a result of the differing roles of these groups and the purpose that they 
play in an audit rotation, the roles of each group were analysed separately for this 
study.  
Table 4.3 lists the participants’ answers in relation to research objective one, which 
was to establish the role of the new external auditor in successful audit firm rotation 
in South Africa. 
Table 4.3 Participants’ responses in relation to research objective one 
Audit team 
member 
Percentage of participants that indicated this 
audit team member is 
Discussed in Influential to an 
audit firm 
rotation 
Not influential to an audit 
firm rotation 
Internal auditor 6 4 4.3.1 
Audit trainees 6 4 4.3.2 
Audit 
management 9 1 4.3.3 
Made up of: 
Audit partner 7 N/a 4.3.3 
Audit manager 2 N/a 4.3.3 
(researcher composed) 
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4.3.1.  Internal audit of the audit client 
Most of the participants (6/10) agreed that the internal audit of the client was an 
important role-player in on-boarding a new audit firm.  
Surprisingly, out of the four that disagreed with the internal audit being a valuable 
role-player three were auditors, with two auditors indicating that not all audits are 
structured in such a way that a control reliance approach can be adopted. The risk 
assessment procedures of the auditor would determine if an auditor would rely on 
the internal controls. In one auditor’s opinion (A6), the majority of audits even in the 
listed client market do not fully rely on internal controls like an internal audit. When 
audit management chooses not to rely on internal controls this means that there is 
decreased importance placed on the work of the internal audit function of the audit 
client.  
One of the auditors (A2) in the sample indicated the reason why the internal audit 
function is not important in an audit firm rotation is that not all listed or public interest 
companies will have their own internal audit function. This auditor added that when 
the internal audit function is outsourced at the audit client it can decrease the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function and therefore less reliance can be placed 
on the work of the internal auditors. In addition, when the internal audit function is 
outsourced, this function is viewed as a cost centre for management and therefore 
may not be available at the same time as the external audit as management may 
need to incur additional fees for the services of an internal auditor. Therefore, in a 
sense the use of the internal audit function (and other internal controls) by the 
external auditor is actually not an option, and the function is unavailable or weak. A 
number of smaller listed clients rely on the external auditor for credibility. Many of 
these smaller firms have the internal audit function to comply with governance 
requirements only and the external auditor provides sufficient integrity for 
management.  
All four participants that answered in the negative mentioned that internal audit 
functions are currently underutilised by external auditors, and this may have created 
complacency in the internal audit function, as they are not pushed by the external 
auditors to increase their standards. On the other hand, the external audit has 
47 
become accustomed to not relying on the internal auditor and therefore this function 
is irrelevant to the audit firm changeover.  
The six participants who answered that the role of the internal audit function is 
important in an audit firm rotation all related this to the very largest listed companies, 
for example the banking sector. It seems from their responses that the larger listed 
clients and the banks cannot be audited without some reliance on the internal audit 
functions of these entities. The audit clients in the sample seem to suggest that the 
internal auditor has a better understanding of the business and its processes than 
the external auditor does. This is especially true at the beginning of the relationship 
between the audit firm and its audit client. As a result of this deeper knowledge of 
the audit client, the internal auditor needs to be included in the work of a new 
external auditor from the beginning. The audit clients indicated that from their 
perspective, the internal auditor is another “line of defence”, and as a result, the 
work of the external and internal auditor should be fully integrated to avoid 
duplication of work. One auditor (A3) brought to light the concerns in section 90 of 
the Companies Act of 2008 (RSA, 2008); this is important as the auditor cannot 
place “too much” reliance on the work of the internal auditor.  
4.3.2.  Audit trainees 
There was a mixed response (4:6) to the importance of the audit trainees in the 
process of an audit firm rotation. Three auditors and one audit client (4 participants 
in total) indicated that the audit trainees are not important with regard to a firm 
rotation. Four auditors and two audit clients (6 participants in total) expressed the 
importance of the audit trainees to be moderate to high.  
The participants (the four mentioned above) downplayed the importance of the audit 
trainees, on the basis that they are not involved in the decision-making. It was 
submitted that the audit trainees are (considered) not experienced enough to offer 
an opinion to the management of the audit. The audit trainees are said not to 
influence the audit firm rotation because the audit clients seem to go about their 
business in the same way, regardless of the type of trainees assigned to the audit. 
One audit manager expressed that even if an audit trainee had insight into the audit, 
it is sometimes overlooked by management because of who is offering the insight. 
The audit managers mentioned that audit trainees need a fair amount of coaching 
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and therefore may absorb resources instead of adding value to the audit. This group 
of dissenters was sceptical of the skill and ability of the audit trainees.  
Among the second group of participants indicated that the audit trainees have 
important roles in an audit firm rotation, a common theme was the audit trainees’ 
proximity to the audit client. These participants sited that the audit trainees’ 
interaction with the audit client seems more important than their interaction with the 
audit management. Audit trainees are said to be important because they deal 
directly with the audit client. Thus, the audit trainees are well positioned to identify 
and access audit risks much faster than for example the partner. The reason for this 
is that immediately after an audit firm rotation the new audit partner would have little 
knowledge of the environment and the risks that are present at the new audit client. 
The audit trainees are physically at the client on a daily basis and therefore gain 
audit client knowledge faster than the audit management.  
One audit client (AC1) added that in addition to the accelerated accumulation of 
audit client knowledge in the first year of the audit, the audit trainees are unable to 
develop strong working relationships with clients. However, sometimes such close 
relationships can be negative or cause conflicts of interest and thus undermine the 
auditor’s independence. The general theme that emerged from this group was that 
the audit client’s perception of the audit firm is developed and then managed by the 
audit trainees and therefore they are important. All the auditors (participants) in this 
group indicated that they actually “cherry pick” their audit trainees from all the 
available trainees when attempting to on-board a new audit client. What is 
interesting is that the majority of the auditors that dissented also admitted that it 
would be beneficial during an audit firm rotation if each audit trainee were picked 
(and trained) to on-board a new client.  
4.3.3.  Audit partner and audit manager 
The audit partner and the audit manager were considered together in this study, 
because the responses of participants were found (in general) to refer to these two 
groups in an interchangeable manner. The interview schedule (see Appendix B) 
contained specific questions that enquired about auditor independence in South 
Africa. However, an interesting observation was that when discussing the audit 
partner, participants had the tendency to comment on the independence of auditors. 
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The cause of this data anomaly could be the media reports regarding accounting 
and auditing irregularities. These reports surfaced only a few months before the 
interviews were conducted. As a result of this observation, this section deals with 
auditor independence in South Africa as well as the role and the effect of the partner 
and manager on the audit. 
Table 4.4 Reasons for the importance of audit management in an audit firm 
rotation 
Reasons for influence on 
audit firm rotations A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 AC1 AC2 AC3 
High degree of experience      
Assumes audit risk       
Audit manager acts as a 
filter to the audit partner   
Audit management is not 




Only one participant indicated that the audit partner and manager do not have a 
critical role to play in an audit rotation. This participant was audit client one (AC1). 
The reason submitted for this decision was that the audit partner and the audit 
manager do not have a high physical presence at the audit client even when the 
audit client is new. The partner and manager therefore are unfamiliar with the client 
for the first few years of being appointed. In addition, the audit partner will for the 
most part only be involved in the audit matters that require their technical opinion.  
The other nine participants agreed that the audit partner and audit manager are very 
influential people in an audit firm rotation. The relationship of the audit partner and 
audit manager is nuanced and interdependent. Five positive replies focused on the 
fact that the audit partner has the most experience, in the subject of auditing, as 
compared to the rest of the team. The audit partner has the most audit experience 
for dealing with a new audit client and therefore, when a contentious issue arises, 
the audit partner is often required to weigh in on the matter and then seek a 
resolution. The audit partner is also perceived to have the most technical ability on 
the team and therefore they need to deal with technical matters. In comparison to 
what was indicated by AC1 (above), there was agreement between the two lines of 
reasoning. 
50 
Furthermore, the respondents submitted reasons that surrounded the fact that the 
audit partner assumes the risk in the audit. In a statutory audit, the audit partner that 
signs an audit report can be held legally liable for errors and negligence, even if 
these were not on the part of the audit partner or even the audit team (IRBA, 2005). 
As the individual that is assuming the risk in an audit engagement, the audit partner 
is professed to be internally motivated to look more carefully at the risks that a new 
client may pose. This may be done through the audit acceptance procedures that 
the audit partner undertakes, or the risk assessment procedures that are performed 
after acceptance of an audit client. As pointed out by many participants, the problem 
with these procedures and measures is the standardisation of these procedures 
across audit firms. Each audit firm operates under a unique, firm-specific audit 
methodology, which may mean that even though all firms are required to comply 
with the International Standards for Auditing (ISAs), the procedures performed by 
two given firms may be very different. Thus, hypothetically, two partners from 
different audit firms may accept identical clients but these partners may allocate 
these clients different risk ratings based on the risk assessment procedures and 
preliminary engagement activities employed, and these procedures are dictated by 
the firm’s audit methodology. Consequently, even though these three participants 
indicated that the audit partner is important because of the audit partner's 
assumption of risk, they stressed that the audit partner may be disadvantaged due 
to the difference in the risk rating of an audit client. When the audit partner is unable 
to or limited in accurately assessing the audit client inherent in a given audit client, 
this can make the process of an audit firm rotation extremely difficult and very risky 
for the new audit partner 
The last two participants of the nine that answered in the affirmative actually stated 
that the audit manager was equally if not more powerful than the audit partner. Both 
participants agreed that the audit manager is influential because managers tend to 
deal with the majority of the queries raised by the audit team and the audit client. In 
addition, the audit manager actually filters the queries and challenges before these 
are mentioned to the audit partner. In this role of acting like a filter for the audit 
partner, it is suggested that the audit manager can even create a perception of the 
audit and the audit client in the mind of the audit partner. The audit partner views 
information from the audit manager as more reliable than information that is coming 
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from either the audit team members or especially the audit client. Consequently, the 
partner is more inclined to act based on the information received from the audit 
manager. This situation is amplified with a new audit client, as the audit partner 
would have a very weak relationship with and a limited understanding of the audit 
client.  
All nine participants indicated that the audit management group (audit manager and 
audit partner) is a key role-player in an audit rotation because they are involved in 
audit decision-making. As explained above, the audit manager is viewed as the filter 
to the audit partner and the audit partner being the risk-taker is responsible for the 
final decision. The decisions that are envisaged are not only at the auditor’s 
approach to auditing the new client but also at the conclusion and evaluation stages 
of the audit.  
It was interesting to note that the majority of audit clients that participated felt that 
there was a problem with auditor independence in mind, yet the majority of the 
auditors that participated felt there was no problem 
4.3.4.  The state of auditor independence in South Africa 
When the topic of new or incumbent auditors was raised with the participants, all 
seemed to merge this topic with the state of auditor independence in South Africa. 
As indicated, this could have resulted because of the recent media reports 
surrounding the time of the interviews. Conversely, this indicates that the rotation of 
an audit firm is linked in the minds of the sample population with the topic of auditor 
independence. 
All participants (10/10) agreed that “auditor independence in the eyes of the public” 
(independence in appearance) had been lost. The reasons submitted were that the 
recent media reports had painted the auditing profession in a very bad light. The 
unanimous nature of this response reveals a firm conclusion that the auditor’s 
integrity in the eyes of the public seems to be lost. The research has chosen to 
refrain from commenting on the media reports around the issues of auditor 
independence, because these matters are still currently under investigation and it 
would be premature to comment on such a topic.  
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In contrast to those responses, when participants were asked about the auditor’s 
independence of mind there was a fractured response, which was particularly 
interesting. All audit clients (AC1, AC2 and AC3), together with one auditor (A5), 
indicated that they believe that the auditing profession has lost its independence of 
mind. The majority of this group (A5, AC2 and AC3) indicated that the lack of auditor 
independence stems from the fact that the audit client is paying that auditor an audit 
fee. The auditor is expected to be independent and act objectively in relation to the 
audit client yet there is clearly a conflict of interests present within the auditor. This 
is because if the audit firm does not keep the audit client happy it may lose the 
revenue associated with that client. These participants however offered no solution 
to this perceived conflict of interest when enquired. This problem does seem to be 
entrenched in the auditor-audit client relationship and the agency problem. The 
other participant that indicated that the auditor is dependent of mind (AC1) could not 
specify the exact reason for this perception. It was interesting to note that on the 
topic of independence of mind all the audit clients (and one auditor) felt the same 
way, with the majority of the auditors feeling the exact opposite way.  
This understanding is critical with the implementation of MAFR situations like the 
rotation of an audit firm because of dissatisfaction that could be more commonplace. 
Currently, the investing community would view a sudden change of audit firm with 
some suspicion; once the regulation is implemented, such rotation may be viewed 
as slightly less concerning. 
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Factors that affect auditor independence are listed in Figure 4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1 Impact factors on auditor independence 
(researcher composed) 
The other six auditors conceded that in South Africa the auditor may have lost the 
independence in appearance, but they denied (some vehemently so) that the 
auditing profession has lost its independence of mind. These auditors contested that 
independence in appearance can be lost by the actions of a few “bad apples”. On 
the other hand, they submitted that countless individual auditors are acting 
objectively and with integrity and that these “good” actions provide evidence for the 
auditor’s independence of mind. Four of these six auditors mentioned the 
robustness of the audit procedures that meet the requirements of the audit firms’ 
methodology, legislation and the ISAs. They indicated that if these were to be 
performed correctly, the objective of independence would be achieved. A4 astutely 
recognised that these audit procedures and requirements required a person of 
integrity and only then would they work as intended. A7 summed the comments of 
this group up well when he said that the IRBA has not demonstrated the lack of 
auditor independence sufficiently and therefore doubt on this matter will continue, 
especially in auditors that are exercising caution in their work.  
Positive impact on auditor's 
independence
• Numerious actions by a number of auditors
• Stringent requirements of the legistation
and standards that govern audit procedures
Negative impact on auditor's 
independence
• Media reports
• Recent accounting and auditing failures
• Perception of the general public
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4.3.5.  Mandatory audit partner rotation as a driver for auditor independence 
Currently, in South Africa, mandatory audit partner rotation is enforced to maintain 
and increase auditor independence. This regulation, which is found in section 90 of 
the Companies Act of 2008 (RSA, 2008), requires that the audit partner of an audit 
engagement is rotated every five years with a three-year cooling off period, before 
that partner can be reappointed. With this regulation, the audit firm maintains the 
relationship with the audit client, but it results in the partner that is responsible for 
the audit being changed.  
When participants were asked if they thought that this regulation achieves auditor 
independence, 20% of them said they did not feel that this regulation works in the 
South African context. They went so far as to indicate that there needs to be a 
change in the current legislation. Their reasoning is that audit partners tend to share 
information and experience with other audit partners within the same audit firm and 
that this knowledge sharing process is a formal process that generally takes place 
when one partner hands over to another partner. This informal knowledge sharing 
may lead to the new partner being influenced (advertently or inadvertently) by the 
old partner’s ideas about the audit client. This is especially the case when a junior 
partner is replacing a senior partner or even the managing partner. Furthermore, the 
relationship between partners of the same audit firm is generally the same as 
business partners as these people are in business together. A given partner would 
have a monetary incentive as well as an incentive to protect his business partner 
and friend. Therefore, a new audit partner may not disclose discovered 
shortcomings of their fellow previous partner immediately after a partner rotation. 
The course of action for an audit partner in this case may very well be to correct the 
error in the current period.  
The participants that asserted that mandatory partner rotation increased auditor 
independence were divided on the extent to which it is effective. The only two in this 
sub-group were audit clients who suggested that the impact of partner rotation 
although positive is small or even negligible. The reasons for this were very similar 
to the reasoning of those that disagreed with the positive impact (mentioned above). 
The other six in this group were all auditors (a part from A3 who was in the group 
that denied an impact) who agreed that the impact of audit partner rotation is 
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material. A1 mentioned that audit partners actually hold each other accountable; 
they do not want their audit firm to be in the spotlight for irregular action as that 
action may result in their business suffering great financial loss. This participant 
indicated that if a new audit partner discovered the errors of a previous audit partner, 
the new audit partner would request clarity on the matter, effectively holding the 
previous audit partner to account. 
The most prominent response when arguing for the merits of mandatory partner 
rotation was that a new audit partner on an audit brings a fresh perspective to the 
audit. A2 said it best as, “ethics is determined by multiple people looking at that 
thing”. This is achieved with partner rotation with a new “pair of eyes” and it is 
possible that questions that were overlooked or judgements that were just assumed 
would be unearthed. A5 even mentioned that having a new audit partner is like 
having a new audit engagement altogether. The change of the audit partner limits 
the possibility of a long-term relationship with an audit client, which is one of the 
things the IRBA noted in its Consultation Paper on MAFR (this was discussed in 
Chapter 2) (IRBA, 2016b). All the auditors that agreed with mandatory audit partner 
rotation improving auditor independence also admitted that these benefits are 
contingent on the individual risk preferences and personalities of the audit partners. 
Each audit partner just like each human has risk preferences; similarly, the audit 
partners that are risk averse would scrutinise an inherited audit engagement, which 
would not necessarily be the case if the new audit partner is not as risk averse as 
the previous one. Audit quality control partners as envisaged in the ISA also play a 
pivotal role in an audit and even a change in this partner can have a large impact 
on the audit. Another important consideration is that IFAC actually prescribes audit 
partner rotation instead of audit firm rotation in their public response to the IRBA’s 
call for comments on MAFR in 2016 (IFAC, 2017). The IFAC demonstrates that 
mandatory audit partner rotation is internationally accepted as a method to increase 
auditor independence. 
4.4.  Previous auditor’s role in MAFR 
The majority of professionals (8) interviewed agreed that the previous auditor’s role 
in a rotation is important. Two audit clients and six auditors were among the 
interviewees that felt this way. This finding was interesting because the previous 
56 
auditors’ role in the new audit is expected to diminish given that they are rotating off 
the audit client. The previous auditor’s impact on an audit firm rotation, however, 
can be limited as the new and most influential role-players to the success of a 
rotation seem to be the new audit firm (see Section 4.2 above) and audit client (see 
Section 4.4 below for discussion of audit client’s role). The one negative 
consequence that the previous auditor can help to limit is the loss of institution 
intelligence. Participants identified the loss of institutional intelligence as a 
determinant of the success of the MAFR regulation (see Table 4.5 below). 
Table 4.4 Effect of the previous audit on an audit firm rotation 
Reasons for influence on 
audit firm rotations A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 AC1 AC2 AC3 
Determining the new audit 
firm    
Able to reduce loss of 
institutional intelligence         
Time spent onboarding the 
new auditor   
Previous audit firm is not 




The influence of the previous audit firm in the small to medium tier audit market 
seems to be amplified. The perception of participants that operate in the small to 
medium sector of the audit services sector is that they believe that there is a higher 
level of competition, which causes the market to react very differently to the Big Four 
sector. In the small audit sectors, for example, the previous auditor is, as a matter 
of course, requested to provide the audit client with a list of possible (alternative) 
audit firms that would take over the audit. In this way, the previous auditor can 
recommend an incumbent (new) audit firm that will cooperate with them and thus 
share or swap clients between themselves. The participants indicated that this sort 
of collaborating between audit firms is very common.  
Those who advocated for the importance of the previous audit firm all focused their 
reasoning around the importance of client knowledge sharing between the previous 
auditor and the incumbent auditor, particularly during the incumbent auditor’s 
planning of the audit. It is clear that there has to be knowledge shared between the 
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incumbent auditors and the previous auditor. The underlying reason for this 
emphasis is the time it takes to on-board a new client (or new auditor). As indicated 
in Chapter 2, in countries where MAFR has been implemented, there is significant 
money and time spent to on-board the new audit clients (or audit firms if looked at 
from the audit clients’ perspective). Both the audit client’s management and the new 
audit firm are required to invest money and time during this on-boarding process. In 
this case, the previous auditors would have gathered an understanding of the audit 
client and the audit risks presented in the audit during their tenure. Therefore, to 
limit the cost of a rotation, the previous auditor should be used to assist with the 
onboarding. This is somewhat the case currently, the previous auditor generally 
meets the incumbent auditor, and limited access to the prior year audit file can 
sometimes be granted to the incumbent auditor.  
The audit client’s main concern with regard to the previous auditor and incumbent 
auditor relationship is the time invested in the previous auditor and the fact that this 
should not be lost. The audit client’s expectation is that the previous auditor will 
communicate effectively with the incumbent auditor and there will be a thorough 
exchange of knowledge, and that this would require less investment time into the 
incumbent. The audit client participants admit that this rarely seems to be the case 
and often the audit client is required to reproduce documents and answer questions 
that were asked by the previous auditor. This can contribute to the stress and 
frustration of the audit client. 
The two participants that disagreed with the importance of the previous auditor’s 
role indicated that the previous auditor still has a limited role to play in a rotation. 
However, they said the previous auditor is not critical to the success of an audit 
rotation, although the previous auditor would need to be used during the pre-
engagement and risk assessment procedures. They (the previous audit firm) are 
valuable purely because of their superior knowledge of the client. Audit planning, 
risk assessment, and pre-engagement activities are important and take place at the 
beginning of every audit but these processes are iterative. These participants thus 
argued that the nature of the planning process means that the previous auditor’s 
involvement is generally limited to the beginning of an audit, and yet even then the 
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planning may later change, resulting in a decrease in the impact of the previous 
auditor.  
In addition, a situation could arise in which an incumbent auditor discovers an error 
of judgement on the previous auditor’s part, in the prior years’ financial statements. 
Therefore, in order to maintain independence gained from the audit firm rotation, the 
involvement of the previous audit firm needs to be limited in the current audit.  
4.4.1. The relationship between the incumbent and previous audit firms 
A very interesting finding was that in the interview schedule (Appendix B) there was 
no specific question enquiring about the state of the relationship between the 
previous auditor and the incumbent auditor. Yet, even though their thoughts were 
not sought, six participants commented on this matter of their own will. The other 
four were allowed to comment freely at first, and then given the semi-structured 
nature of the interview, the interviewer requested their comments on the state of the 
previous audit and incumbent auditor relationship. The fact that six participants were 
not prompted, but felt it was important enough to raise, indicates the significance of 
this matter in the minds of experts interviewed.  
The unanimous (10/10) response to the relationship between the incumbent auditor 
and the previous auditor was that the relationship is poor or lacking and the 
information transfer that is supposed to happen is inadequate. All audit firms have 
developed their own audit methodology, which guides the audit firm employees on 
how to conduct an audit, and it is the most valuable intellectual property of the audit 
firm. An audit methodology secures an audit firm’s existence and survival. Thus, 
there are a number of internal firm specific rules that regulate the exchange of 
information in the previous auditor and incumbent auditor relationship. These rules 
are in place to ensure that a competing audit firm that happened to be an incumbent 
audit firm on a previous audit client is unable to decipher the audit methodology.  
The ISA specifies that the incumbent auditor should seek the advice of the previous 
auditor before taking on a new audit client. This meeting is contingent on whether 
or not the audit client will allow the incumbent auditor to meet the previous auditor, 
with the previous audit getting to decide what will be disclosed and how this 
information will be disclosed. Although this is a standard practice, the information 
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that is transferred seems not to meet the needs of all the stakeholders. Participants 
generally agreed that this relationship and information transfer seems to be more 
effective when both the previous and incumbent auditors are members of the Big 
Four firms. The reason that was submitted for this was that the employees of the 
Big Four have an understanding that the other audit firm will cooperate should help 
be required in the future. 
The fact that audit firms seem to guard their audit methodology so tightly seems 
odd, given that all audit firms in the development of their audit methodology are 
applying the same set of standards for the performance of an audit, with the 
standards being those of the ISA. Surprisingly, participants indicated they believe 
that the difference in audit methodologies can prove to be so different that even if 
the previous auditor had gathered audit evidence on a specific balance, there is a 
possibility that the collected audit evidence (that was collected using the previous 
auditors’ methodology) may not be sufficient or appropriate to satisfy the incumbent 
auditor’s methodology. There is an additional concern surrounding this 
dysfunctional relationship, as A5 articulated; “Why would an [incumbent] auditor 
need to do so much work on the opening balances when the previous auditor 
already audited them? …Why can an [incumbent] auditor not just rely on the work 
of the previous auditor?” All of the auditor interviewees demonstrated in their 
responses that there was a lack of trust between audit firms. This may reveal that 
auditors are not confident about the objectivity, independence, or competence of 
their fellow auditor, just because of a difference of methodology.  
4.5. The audit client’s role in MAFR 
All the participants in this study downplayed the importance, skill, efficiency and/or 
education of junior and middle management at the audit client in determining the 
success of an audit firm rotation. It would seem plausible that competence and skill 
of these staff members would affect the efficiency and quality of an audit, although 
the study participants indicated that the impact of such individuals is negligible in 
comparison to the impact of top management on an audit firm rotation. This is 
unusual as these junior and middle management staff members at the audit client 
are generally the individuals that will interact with the auditor on a daily basis. The 
reason for the lack of importance of this group is their apparent lack of decision-
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making power at the audit client. In addition, the auditor participants feel that they 
will still be able to extract the appropriate information irrespective of the type of junior 
and middle management. One area that was not explored by the participants was 
the impact that such staff can have on the decisions of the top management. Table 
4.6 sets out this finding as well as the other findings discussed in this section. 
Table 4.5 Factors affecting the role of the audit client 
Factor determining effect of an 
audit firm rotation Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
Experience and qualifications of 
the junior and middle 
management 
0% 100% 
Effectiveness of the audit 
committee at the audit client 80% 20% 
Made up of:  
Involvement of the audit committee 
in onboarding a new audit firm. 
40% n/a 
Stress and frustration of the audit 
client. 70% 30% 
Time and involvement of top 
management at the audit client 100% 0% 
(researcher composed) 
4.5.1. Audit committee of the audit client 
Eight participants mentioned that the role of the audit committee in an audit rotation 
is critical to its success. The audit committee represents the shareholders’ interests 
in a very special way. The audit committee is tasked in the King IV report to oversee 
the auditor’s independence and to inspect and review the quality of the audit (IoDSA, 
2016). It was submitted that in the past the audit committees have sometimes been 
more focused on the reputation or brand name of an audit. When MAFR is 
implemented, there is hope that this will change and that audit committees will start 
to look more closely at the work that is being done by the auditor. The role of the 
audit committee as pictured by the participants is one that is dynamic and almost 
that of an intermediary between the audit client and auditor. Four of these 
participants indicated that currently most audit committees are not as involved in the 
on-boarding process of a new audit firm. The participants stated that the audit 
committee has traditionally taken a very “high level” approach to the on-boarding of 
a new audit firm. These participants felt that the audit client’s audit committee should 
assist the new audit firm to achieve the effectiveness of the audit firm rotation. This 
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envisaged role needs to be embarked on thoughtfully, given that objectivity of the 
auditor needs to be maintained even from the audit committee. It was stated in 
Chapter 2 that this MAFR regulation would be assumed to decrease the autonomy 
and use of the audit committee. Furthermore, it is clear that the participants still see 
an important role for the audit committee.  
4.5.2. The audit client’s stress and frustration during an audit rotation 
The relationship between an auditor and an audit client can be a strenuous one. The 
auditor generally visits the audit client to perform the audit at the year-end, which is 
the busiest time for the finance staff of the audit client. The auditor would question 
numerous judgements, estimates and amounts (rightfully so) that may have their 
origin in the prior months or years in order to arrive at an opinion. Any of this could 
result in a tenuous relationship. Participants were not specifically requested to 
comment on the changes to this audit client/auditor relationship, yet 70% of all 
participants commented on it. All the audit clients that were interviewed as well as 
57% of the auditors mentioned this aspect (i.e. there were 4 auditor participants and 
3 audit clients – to make up the seven).  
The audit clients indicated that their frustration emanates from the fact that even 
when there is a new audit firm to on-board, the workload of the audit client’s staff 
does not decrease. There is no relief to accommodate the extra work that a new 
audit firm would pose to the audit client staff. Consequently, the additional work and 
time investments that are needed to on-board a new audit firm is in addition to the 
normal workloads and deadlines that are commonplace at the year-end. This 
additional work can even be said to decrease the quality of life for staff at the audit 
client because there is little rest from their work. The stress that can be felt by the 
audit clients can lead to the audit client missing other work deadlines and to general 
discontent at work.  
Secondly, from the perspective of the audit client, there will be requests from the 
new auditors that could seem to be a proliferation of audit documentation. The 
previous auditor during the prior audit would have enquired audit evidence about 
processes and transactions that appeared to be risky in an audit sense. If the new 
auditor were to assess the risks around these processes and transactions in the 
same way, then the new auditor would request the same information that the 
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previous auditor would have already requested. This second request by the new 
auditor, for the same information, can be very frustrating to the audit client. This is 
because generally, if the information requested does not relate specifically to the 
current year, the audit client would have some difficulty obtaining the records from 
the archives, and this would add an additional task to the audit client staff’s 
workload.  
As mentioned above, all audit firms have a unique audit methodology that can be 
very different from each other. If the staff of the audit client has grown accustomed 
to providing audit documentation in a specific way or format to the previous auditors 
that matches or suits the previous auditor’s methodology, the change of audit 
methodology can frustrate the client. Many entities would orientate their finance 
department and processes in a way that enables staff to extract the information that 
would meet the needs of their auditor. In South Africa, given the lack of audit firm 
rotation before the implementation of this regulation (please see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of this), this kind of legacy would be the present. The audit client will be 
requested by the new audit firm to provide information in different ways to those they 
are used to and this would require the audit client to possibly change their 
processes.  
4.5.3. Time and involvement of top management at the audit client 
As mentioned above, the participants in the study did not feel that the junior or 
middle management even in the finance department had an effect on the success 
of a rotation. The participants did specify that the role and responsibilities of the top 
management at the audit client had a very different outcome.  
Participants indicated that currently the role of the top management is not as critical 
to the outcome of an audit. In many cases, top management only gets involved in a 
few matters. This would need to change if audit firm rotations are to be more 
effective. The top management needs to be more involved and available to address 
the questions and queries of the new auditors. The time of top management is very 
valuable and hard to come by, yet in cases when top management at the audit client 
has been invested in the audit firm rotation process all participants reported vastly 
improved results.  
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Out of the ten participants surveyed, all indicated that the presence of top 
management in the audit process is beneficial. Six participants indicated that the 
impact of top management on an audit is significant; however, the other four 
participants suggested that the participation of top management in an audit firm 
rotation is more than significant. The involvement of top management into the audit 
was suggested by A4 to actually reduce the alma mater threat mentioned in Chapter 
2 (Section 2.2.1). This is achieved in the follow way – once the top management is 
involved with the audit they will build trust and a relationship of understanding that 
they have been used to getting from their alma mater firm. This is interesting 
because as seen in Section 2.2.1, the alma mater threat to independence can 
actually prevent an audit firm from being appointed let alone be involved in the audit. 
At the audit client, top management would have the most experience working in new 
and difficult situations; as a result, these people would be the best personnel to 
include in the audit rotation proceedings. Their expertise, knowledge of the business 
and problem-solving ability would reduce the onboarding times materially.  
4.6. Key factors that are affecting the success of audit firm rotation in 
South Africa 
Table 4.7 below indicates the percentage of auditors and audit clients that 
mentioned key factors. In this table, the sample is segregated into their position and 
occupation.  
Table 4.7 Other key factors affecting audit firm rotations 
Other key factors to 
audit firm rotations 
Percentage of auditor 
participants that raise this 
factor (out of seven) 
Percentage of audit 
client participants 
that raise this factor 
(out of three) 
Timing of the audit (all 
three perspectives) 100% 0% 
Audit firm size in 









4.6.1. The timing of the audit rotations 
Four participants mentioned that the timing of the audit is very important to the 
smoothness of a rotation, and an additional three participants mentioned that the 
timing of the proposed audit tenure is important (total of seven). Only auditors, the 
majority of the participants, mentioned that this is important; however, that does not 
generally represent the entire population. The auditors looked at timing of rotations 
from three perspectives.  
The first perspective was the timing of appointing the auditor in relation to the year-
end of the audit client. There is a school of thought that if an audit client’s 
management wants to manipulate the outcome of an audit, the audit client will wait 
until the last possible moment before they announce that they would want to change 
an auditor. This can create a situation in which the new audit firm is appointed later 
in the financial year of the audit client. The new audit firm would be unable to 
complete the audit to the highest standards possible because they would be under 
pressure to complete the audit within the specified deadlines. These participants 
added a proviso that the practice described above is most common among clients 
that are not public interest entities (i.e. entities that are not subject to the MAFR 
regulation currently). This practice is feared to become more prevalent with the 
introduction of MAFR. The argument is that if audit firm rotations are painted in a 
favourable light then this may pose a loophole that governing bodies can attempt to 
exploit. The time between an audit firm’s first appointment and the year-end is 
critical; the length of this period will determine whether the audit firm would be able 
to perform an interim audit or early verification procedures, which could reduce the 
burden at the year-end audit. Early verification procedures comprise audit work that 
is performed immediately before the year-end, in which the auditor would perform 
an audit for the first eleven months for example, so that after year-end there is just 
one month more to audit. The one positive is that the appointment of the auditor is 
not entirely out of the control of the audit firm. This is because the audit firm can 
decline to be appointed late. The ticking matter though is when competition is tough 
and margins are low, it may be difficult for an audit firm to decline new business.  
Secondly, each audit firm has yearly cycles, for example, the busiest periods for a 
hypothetical audit firm may be the months of June and December to February. If a 
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new audit client were to have a year-end that falls within that time the audit firm may 
struggle to accumulate resources, most importantly staff for the audit. If an audit 
client were to be accepted and then require the audit work to be performed during 
a busy time, the audit firm may have to involve other audit firms or hire additional 
staff and these costs would impact the audit fees.  
Finally, the audit participants questioned the ten-year period that has been gazetted 
in parliament (The IRBA, 2016a). There was suspicion around where this time was 
short enough to maintain independence, and yet long enough to limit the negative 
impacts of MAFR. As the purpose of this study was not to focus on the negative 
impacts around MAFR, this matter is not discussed further.  
4.6.2. Audit firm size in relation to audit client 
The theme of the audit firm’s size was one that seemed to come up regularly when 
the participants were required to discuss other factors affecting the smoothness of 
a new audit firm. This theme seemed to manifest in two smaller themes or sub-
themes, namely capacity of the audit firm and audit fee pressure.  
As the expert participants were conceptualising the idea of the MAFR regulation, 
many questioned the ability of the audit firms in the small to medium market in 
dealing with the amount of audit rotations. It should be noted that the current 
regulation does not envisage that all companies are to mandatorily rotate audit firms, 
but the likely scenario is that this legislation may be expended to all companies. This 
scenario was presented to the participants. Participants indicated that as the smaller 
firms move to a larger market the ability of the audit firm to satisfy the audit client 
becomes imperative. Audit client participants indicated that smaller audit firms would 
not have the geographical footprint to handle the larger clients. In addition, the 
smaller firms are not considered able to handle the large technical matters that may 
arise in an audit of a JSE listed entity. On the other hand, the Big Four firms have 
vast resources in the areas of accounting and auditing technical advice and these 
resources are perceived to improve the quality of an audit. Most disturbing is that 
the participants indicated that the smaller audit firms seem more likely to be 
overpowered by an anchor audit client, which can result in the audit firm 
compromising on audit quality or independence. The participants suggested that the 
Big Four firms should only be allowed to be appointed to audit the larger audit 
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clients, medium audit firms should only audit medium-sized audit clients, and the 
same should apply to the small firms and small audit clients. This reasoning is not 
what is envisaged by the IRBA (IRBA, 2016b). The IRBA clearly indicated that they 
believe that MAFR will increase competition in the audit services sector. However, 
participants suggested that the MAFR solution would ring-fence audit firms to audit 
clients. They added that this is beneficial as it limits the dangers of a mismatch 
between the audit firm size and the audit client. 
Furthermore, participants expressed that the success of audit rotations would 
improve if a decrease in the staff turnover at the audit firms were observed. The 
participants suggested that with the current high turnover in the audit firms, a more 
independent relationship is being created between the auditors and management.  
4.6.3. Maintenance and transfer of institutional intelligence 
Participants argued that the biggest setback of the implementation of MAFR was 
the loss of institutional intelligence by the audit firm. The audit firm of a specific audit 
client is expected to create, maintain, and improve their understanding of the audit 
client and its environment. When audit firms rotate, very little institutional intelligence 
is transferred to the new audit firm. This loss is what contributes to the majority of 
the costs of on-boarding new audit firms. The majority of the practitioners (8/10) 
indicated that learning how to manage the loss of the institutional intelligence is the 
best determinant to the success of the MAFR regulation.  
Participants indicated that this institutional intelligence is multi-layered. A1 explained 
that the institutional intelligence is not only limited to one client. It can relate to the 
industry knowledge of an entire audit firm. Some audit firms may have the majority 
of the companies in a given industry, which places them in a good position for 
understanding the industry. Furthermore, with MAFR this type of specification would 
be hard to attain (as explained in Chapter 2).  
A3 indicated that the loss of institutional intelligence also includes the loss of a 
working relationship between the audit firm and the audit client. This is a contentious 
matter as the relationship between the audit firm and the audit client can evolve into 
something that can jeopardise the auditor’s independence. Therefore, there is an 
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extremely fine balance between the right working relationship and a detrimental 
working relationship.  
4.6.4. Market concentration in the audit services market 
All the participants indicated, in line with the IRBA, that there is a problem with the 
audit market concentration, particularly in the large listed client or Big Four segment 
of the market. The participants expressed the need for change in this sector. For 
them this change would mark a success in terms of the MAFR regulation. The 
majority of participants (7/10), however, indicated that they could not identify exactly 
how this change would be brought about. These seven indicated they suspect that 
in the large listed audit client sector or the Big Four sector, clients may just rotate 
between the Big Four audit firms. They indicated it would be very unlikely for a large 
listed client to leave the top six audit firms. This is purely because of the ability and 
capacity that these firms have. A4 even went so far as to indicate that this 
concentration is advantageous, because this ensures that none of the smaller audit 
firms are overburdened (thus avoiding mismatch of size – see Section 4.5.2), and it 
ensures that these audit clients receive the busy service.  
With regard to the MAFR regulation on the concentration of the medium and small 
audit services sector, nine participants replied that it would have a negative effect 
on concentration. Interestingly, all the participants that operated in this sector 
believed that there was sufficient competition in this sector and there was no 
problem to be fixed. The participants indicated that the proposed current regulation 
only applies to listed audit clients and therefore the auditors in these sectors 
(medium and small sectors) are unlikely to attract new listed audit clients as a result 
of MAFR. These participants did indicate that with the increased rotation, it is more 
likely for the Big Four audit firms to want to seek a more secure client base. These 
clients would be the clients that are serviced by the medium and small audit services 
sectors. This would increase the competition in a sector where the competition is 
already high. A2 believed that the MAFR regulation will result in the Big Four 
becoming stronger and the smaller firms will suffer. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
The results of the study were presented in this chapter, with care taken to present 
the results in a way that makes it easy to link them back to the research objectives 
of this study. The roles of the audit firm or auditor, the audit client, the previous 
auditor and the key factors determining success of MAFR were analysed. In the next 
and final chapter, the recommendations of the study are explored and concluding 
remarks are made.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4, the results of the in-depth interviews with accounting practitioners were 
presented and analysed. The research data were also used to expand the current 
understanding of the roles of the players in an audit firm rotation and factors that 
affect that process. 
In this chapter, the research results are summarised and conclusions provided on 
each objective of the study. Further, proposed recommendations are provided. 
These recommendations are a mixture of transformations proposed by the 
participants and required changes deducted through the data analysis process. 
Ensuring that the MAFR regulation is a sustainable and workable solution is critical 
as the regulation will be implemented regardless of whether individual practitioners 
take time to investigate the required changes. Most importantly though is that if 
changes are not made, the survival of auditing as a viable business may be 
threatened due to the already heavy pressure on the audit services market.  
5.2. Conclusions from the study 
The study found, that members in the accounting practice generally do not support 
the MAFR regulation, with many indicating that there is little or no evidence of a link 
between MAFR and remedying the market concentration in the audit services 
market. The verdict on the link between improving auditor independence and the 
proposed MAFR regulation was perceived by participants as being a lot stronger.  
5.2.1. Role of the incumbent (new) audit firm in audit firm rotation 
The roles of the individual role-players that may make up the audit team of the 
incumbent audit were analysed individually. The internal audit function was 
analysed as part of this team as the internal audit function does provide some audit 
evidence and work for the incumbent auditor. There was a mixed reception to the 
importance of the internal audit function in an audit firm rotation. Few audit clients 
have a strong and effective audit function. For the one that do have such a function, 
including internal auditors in the onboarding of new audit firms is vital. The superior 
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audit client knowledge of the internal audit function would assist to new audit firm to 
come “up to speed at the audit client much faster.” 
The audit trainees may not have decision-making power at the audit firm; often 
trainees absorb time and resources because of their inexperience. However, the 
audit trainees interact with the audit client on a daily basis. The audit trainees create 
and maintain the perception of the audit client about the new audit firm. In this sense 
they are very important, because they determine the efficiency and effectiveness 
with which the audit can be conducted.  
The power and influence dynamics between the audit partner and the audit manager 
proved very interesting. Some participants suggested that because the audit partner 
is the highest decision maker on an audit team, it follows that they are the most 
influential. Others indicated that the audit manager is most powerful, given their 
roles as a filter for the audit partner. Regardless of which group is more influential, 
an almost unanimous finding was that these people’s skills are critical to the 
smoothness of an audit firm rotation.  
The independence of the incumbent auditor and the current legislation of mandatory 
audit partner rotation were explored. Participants felt that the independence in 
appearance had been totally lost. There were mixed perceptions about the 
independence in mind. It was interesting to note that the majority of audit clients felt 
that there was a problem with auditor independence in mind, yet the majority of the 
auditors that participated felt there was no problem. The current regime of 
mandatory audit partner rotation was found to aid the situation although its impact 
was felt to be limited.  
5.2.2. Role of the previous audit firm in an audit firm rotation 
 The majority of the participants agreed that the audit firm rotation requires the 
cooperation of the previous audit firm and the new audit firm. This ensures that there 
is little of no loss of institutional intelligence. Most importantly, if this relationship 
between the new audit firm and the previous audit firm is functional, then there are 
material cost savings that can be made. It was noted that the importance of the 
previous audit firm is highlighted in the small and medium tier audit firms, and the 
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type of audit client that this market attracts relies heavy on the previous audit firm to 
assist with the selection of the new auditor (please see Section 2.3).  
5.2.3. Role of the audit client in the audit firm rotation 
Interestingly, it was found that the audit client members that interact the most with 
the audit team, namely junior and medium management, were actually not important 
to the participants. The participants actually felt that these individuals were 
superfluous to the audit firm rotation process. Participants went on to indicate that 
the qualification level of such individuals is irrelevant to the audit firm rotation.  
An important finding of this objective was the work and time that are expected from 
the staff at the audit client. The staff members lamented the hours and patience that 
it takes to on-board a new audit firm. The staff complained that on-boarding a new 
audit firm during the financial year-end is very stressful and thus it negatively affects 
the quality of work performed by both the audit client and the audit firm. Finding 
ways to limit or eliminate this stress is key to making this regulation a success.  
Another factor discussed by participants was the involvement of the top 
management of the audit client in the audit firm onboarding process. The 
participants found that in the past these top management members would leave the 
onboarding to other members of staff that were ranked lower in the audit client 
organisation hierarchy. This was said to be inefficient.  
5.2.4. Other key factors affecting audit firm rotations 
The timing of the audit proved to be very important for the audit participants. The 
most important aspect of the timing of the audit was that when the audit firm is 
appointed this could be viewed as a ploy by the audit client management to affect 
the quality of the audit.  
The participants next turned their attention to loss of institutional intelligence. It was 
indicated that if this problem could be resolved then the regulation stood a better 
chance of being beneficial and with minimum costs.  
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5.3. Recommendations for a good audit firm rotation 
The findings of the studies indicate multiple areas that the participants identified in 
which positive changes are being made towards having efficient and effective audit 
firm rotations in the future. Some key changes need to be made in order to improve 
the process so that when the date of implementation arrives the auditors as well as 
the audit clients would be ready.  
5.3.1. Specific training to prepare role-players for MAFR 
Audit trainees on the audit firm side and the junior and middle management on the 
audit client side would be the ones that are required to do all of the fieldwork 
following an audit firm rotation. As such, these individuals need to be upskilled with 
problem-solving skills and decision-making skills. This will ensure that less reliance 
is placed on the audit management and top management at the audit client. 
Furthermore, given that these are the people that are in the majority in this process 
(in terms of actual number of staff) and that, they are dealing with the challenges on 
a daily basis; it would improve the onboarding process if they have the requisite 
skills. 
5.3.2. Establishment of standards for knowledge sharing between the 
previous audit firm and the new audit firm 
The theme that came up the most regularly in the study was the loss of institutional 
intelligence when there is an audit firm rotation. The other theme that often appeared 
was the apparent lack of meaningful communication between the previous and new 
audit firm. The regulator needs to establish standards for the minimum information 
that must be shared from the previous audit firm with the new audit firm. These 
requirements need to be robust enough to ensure that there is sufficient information 
transferred so as to limit the loss of institutional intelligence. Finally, if the 
relationship and what must be shared is in a sense legalised it will ensure that the 
same quantity and quality of audit information is shared.  
5.3.3. Increase the on-boarding time 
 The on-boarding of a new audit firm was criticised continuously by participants. The 
costs and time involved were found by participants to be distasteful. In order to limit 
the anguish during this time, it should be extended to two to three years. As an audit 
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client is nearing time for a rotation, the client should contract for a joint audit between 
its current audit firm (soon to be previous) and the proposed audit firm that is 
earmarked to take over the audit engagement. This will allow the new audit firm to 
ensure that it covers all the audit risks and has access to the audit evidence of all 
material transactions and judgements. 
5.4. Limitation of this study 
5.4.1. Sample dynamics 
Although grounded theory research does not seek to achieve generalisability 
through using a representative sample, the sample size of ten is still small. This was 
partially mitigated through ensuring the rigorousness of the data collection and 
analysis. The study analysed the data first. A second research expert reviewed the 
data analysis to ensure that the results clearly represented the sample.  
Secondly, there was an unequal weighting between audit participants and audit 
client participants. The audit clients that participated were limited to JSE listed 
entities. This was mitigated by ensuring that the experience and skill of those that 
participated were of a high standard. Also, care was taken to ensure that the auditors 
were well represented in terms of the audit tiers.  
5.4.2. Absence of literature in the South Africa context 
There was very little research on MAFR from the South African perspective. The 
small number of studies that were available were utilised, with a description review 
that comprised mainly international research.  
5.5. Areas for future research 
The perspectives of the investors and shareholders would need to be assessed. 
Additional research can be conducted on the audit client perspective, making sure 
to survey a mixed group of individuals. Also ensuring that a larger sample size is 
utilised.  
The actual economic effects of MAFR need to be analysed once the regulation has 




The research objectives that were set out in Chapter 2 were achieved. The study 
methodology was effectively applied regardless of the limitations that were noted. 
The aim of the study was to understand what strategies and tactics are being used 
to make current audit firm rotations work.  
This research utilised a mixed sample of auditors and audit clients, which is unlike 
other research that has been conducted in South Africa. The contribution of this 
research is twofold. Firstly, it contributes to the existing literature in that it focuses 
on the actual roles of the key groups and key factors in the audit firm rotation 
process. Secondly, it has discovered the perceptions of audit clients. This study has 
yielded recommendations that are feasible and beneficial to implement in the audit 
services market when the implementation of MAFR begins.  
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APPENDIX A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS and FINANCE 
Masters Thesis in Accounting 
Researcher: Mr. Y. Chetty (033 260 5005) 
Supervisor: Mr. J. Deodutt (031 260 7074) 
Research Office: Ms. M. Snyman (031 260 8350) 
Dear Respondent, 
I, Yoshin Chetty a Master of Accounting student, at the School of Accounting, 
Economics and Finance at the University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. You are invited to 
participate in a research project entitled STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH 
MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION PROPOSED BY ACCOUNTING 
PROFESSIONALS.  
The aim of this study is to establish factors relating to execution of an audit firm 
rotation that influences the successful rotation. Through your participation, I hope to 
understand the perceptions of what are the determinants of success of an audit 
rotation. The results of this study are intended to contribute to knowledge of how to 
make rotations move efficient and effective in light of coming audit rotation 
legislation.  
Your participation in this project is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or 
withdraw from the project at any time with no negative consequence. There will be 
no monetary gain from participating in this survey/focus group. Confidentiality and 
anonymity of records identifying you as a participant will be maintained by the 
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance at the University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. 
 If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or about 
participating in this study, you may contact me or my supervisor at the numbers 
listed above.  
The survey should take you about 15 minutes to complete. I hope you will take the 




This page is to be retained by participant 
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Please complete the section below: 
I ……………………………………………………………. (full names of participant) 
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of 
the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.  
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire.  
Additional Consent for Interview  
I hereby provide consent for my interview to be audio-recorded YES / NO 
Signature of Participant………………………………….……… 
Date………………………………………………………..…….. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH MANDATORY AUDIT 
FIRM ROTATION PROPOSED BY ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALS 
The following questionnaire is designed to investigate the opinions of accountants 
in the Kwa Zulu-Natal province about what determines the success of an audit firm 
rotation or changeover. This is becoming more important given the new ruling by 
the IRBA that requires mandatory audit firm rotation from 1 April 2023. Your 
Response will be kept entirely confidential at all times. Please respond by placing 
an X in the block pertaining to the relevant answer.  
Definitions used in the questionnaire. 
Audit rotation is the changing of a company’s audit firm to improve auditor 
independence in audit engagements, improve audit quality or to lower audit fees.  
Audit rotation strategy or plan is a strategy or plan implemented by the audit firms, 
individual auditors or audit clients to make the swap between audit firms more 
effective. In addition, the terms new client audits plans and audit changeover plans 
are equivalent. The words strategy and plans are used interchangeability. 
Incumbent audit firm is the audit firm that is taking on the new client. Audit clients 
my refer to this person as the “new auditors”. The term “Incumbent auditor” is 
equivalent.  
Previous audit firm is the audit firm that has lost the audit and no more performs 
the audit. The term “previous auditor” is equivalent. 
SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS OF RESPONDENT (Indicate your response 
with a cross X) 
1. What is your gender?
Male Female Other 
2. What is your age group?
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65 Older than 
65 
3. To which race do you belong?
African Indian Coloured White Other 
4. How many years of experience do you have as an accounting professional
(including articles and lecturing)?
0-2 3-5 6-10 11-20 More than 20 
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7.1. If you answered “auditor” in 7 above please answer: which of the following 


















8. Indicate the number of audit firm rotations (audits in which one audit firm was
replacing a previous audit firm) you have been involved in any way:
None 1-4 5-10 11-20 21-30 30+ 
9. In your opinion, what is the current state of auditor independence in South Africa,
as you perceive it, and is there a need for IRBA to step in and strengthen auditor
independence?
10. Can you provide your opinion on the current regulation of partner rotation.




11.4. The Audit Client
12. What do you believe is the greatest determinant of a successful or “smooth”
rotation? Please explain your choice.
13. Can you provide your opinion on the following alternatives?
13.1. Mandatory Audit Tendering (MAT), as opposed to MAFR
13.2. Joint Audits (Joint Audit Firms)
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13.3. Do you foresee any direct and indirect consequences, including any 
unintended consequences, of IRBA moving towards MAFR? 
14. Do you foresee any direct and indirect consequences, including any unintended
consequences, of IRBA moving towards MAFR?
15. What strategies would you implement in order to deal with MAFR?
16. IRBA believes that MAFR will address market concentration of audit services
and create a more competitive environment, which will positively influence audit
quality. Do you agree?
17. IRBA believes that MAFR will assist in addressing the transformation of the
auditing profession. Do you agree?
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APPENDIX D: PROOF OF EDITING CERTIFICATE 
